

AN OLD WARRANT.—The original warrant on which John Bunyan was arrested and imprisoned when he wrote the "Pilgrim's Progress," is said to have been recently found in England. It covers half a sheet of foolscap, and in it Bunyan is described as a "tynker."

LETTER-PRESS COPIES.—A curious question in regard to the law of evidence arose in Iowa, on the trial of an agent for embezzlement. The question arose whether letter-press copies of the defendant's letters, containing statements of his accounts with his employers, could be put in as evidence to prove the commission of the offence alleged. No effort was made to show that the original letters could not be produced. It was held that letter-press copies are but copies, and cannot be introduced if the originals are not accounted for.

LIABILITY OF OWNERS OF REAL ESTATE.—In the State of Delaware, in *Diamond Slate Iron Co. v. Giles*, reported in the *National Law Review*, it was decided that, while the owner of real estate is not bound to provide safeguards for wrong-doers, he is bound to take care that those who come upon his premises by express or implied invitation are protected against injury resulting from the unsafe condition of the premises, or from other perils, the existence of which the invited person had no reason to look for. The invitation to come upon dangerous premises, without stating the danger, was culpable, and an injury resulting from it is deserving of compensation in the case of the servant of the person extending the invitation, as in any other case.

CONTEMPT OF COURT.—In a case reported in our American exchanges the defendant was a party to certain actions in the Supreme Court of Montana. While some of these actions were *sub judice*, he caused a telegram to be published in a newspaper of the city in which the court was sitting. This telegram falsely alleged that certain persons, whose names were given, had made a wager that, owing to the influence of adverse claimants, the Supreme Court would reverse its decision in the earlier of these cases. These had been decided in favour of the defendant, and the questions involved in the actions still pending were substantially the same as were formerly decided. Notwithstanding a disclaimer on oath by the defendant of any intention to treat the court with even the slightest contempt, his statement was not accepted, but it was held that the publication was a contempt. His motive was a corrupt one, viz., to improperly influence the court. The case is peculiar, mainly as an illustration of the influences against which an elective judiciary must be careful to guard, if the scales of justice are not to incline unfairly to one party or another. A judge who is naturally thinking of his chances of re-election may fairly be supposed to be amenable to the influence of public opinion, and if he is a conscientious man, there may be an unfair rebound in the opposite direction.