

took advantage of its weight as a development actor to deploy conflict conditionalities in a number of potential regional crises (e.g. the dissolution of the Czecho-Slovakia).

The EU was galvanized by the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo - and the manifest weaknesses and lack of co-ordination of European response - to embark on an ambitious agenda of defence integration. The Treaty of Amsterdam (which came into force in 1999) codified a number of new instruments to improve the co-ordination of member state actions in the field of foreign and security policy. Building on Anglo-French-German consultations through 1998-9, and the deliberations of the Cologne EU Summit in June 1999, the Union decided at the 1999 Helsinki Summit to create a 40,000-60,000 force for rapid deployment in crises and to develop associated independent logistical and intelligence capabilities. If this works (and there are many reasons to presume that it may not), this will provide the Union with an operational capacity for the projection of force as a means of crisis management and military/humanitarian response. How this sits with NATO's broadened crisis mandate and what its implications are for Canada's transatlantic connection remain to be seen.

More broadly, the European Commission and the Council have become increasingly involved in broader security issues through the conclusion of partnership and co-operation and association agreements with most of the states of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as embarking on an ambitious programme of eastward expansion. These agreements generally include provision for consultation and dialogue on security matters as well as on an array of democratization and rights issues that closely parallel the preoccupations of ODIHR. In the meantime, on the basis of an initiative of the European Parliament, the EU has established a network and centre for conflict prevention studies and early warning (the Conflict Prevention Network - CPN - based at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik) that liaises closely with DG1-A on these issues.

In short, the organizational landscape of multilateral efforts to cope with security in the OSCE space is becoming increasingly crowded. In numerous instances, one or more of the above organizations have been involved in extensive co-operation with the OSCE in responses to conflict on the basis of more or less *ad hoc* agreements on division of labour. Just how complex the landscape has become is perhaps best illustrated by example.

Multilateral and State Engagements in Non-Proliferation

The core of multilateral efforts to control proliferation has centred on WMD. The major instruments in this field include:

1. the NPT framework for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons;
2. the Partial (1963) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaties;
3. the conventions on chemical and biological weapons.

In the conventional sphere, perhaps the most prominent achievement with implications for proliferation is the Convention against Land Mines. This success has been followed up by an increasingly active discussion of ways to control the trade in conventional weapons. Efforts to