



until September 1986. The aim of the CCSSBMDE as set down in its mandate was "to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations." The Stockholm Conference was to initiate a process "devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe."

A series of specific measures resulted from the Stockholm process aimed at improving the confidence of participating states in the nature of military activities conducted by other signatories, establishing predictability in military affairs, enhancing transparency and reducing the possibility of surprise attack. Among the measures negotiated were the following:

- agreement to provide prior notification to other members of the CSCE of military activities involving at least 13 000 troops or 300 battle tanks. Prior notification is to be made in writing 42 or more days in advance of the activity.
- agreement to circulate annual calendars of military activity subject to prior notification by November 15 of every year.

— provision to invite observers from every participating state to military activities involving 17 000 troops (or, in the case of amphibious or parachute activity, 5 000 troops) conducted in the area of application in Europe. Each CSCE participant may send up to two observers to each observable activity.

— provision for on-site challenge inspection by any participating state. This provision can be exercised by any state suspecting military activity that has not been notified, or activity suspected to be at the observable threshold for which no invitations have been issued. Within 36 hours of the issuance of an inspection request, the inspectors are to be permitted entry to the territory of the receiving state. No more than three inspections are allowed in a single country within any one year.

To date, there have been over 20 observations and approximately 10 challenge inspections undertaken under the terms of the agreement. Canada has sent observers to every observable military exercise held thus far, and intends to continue this practice. (While Canada is outside the zone of application for the agreement, which only includes the territory of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, Canada can, as a signatory to the Stockholm Document, participate fully in observations and inspections.) On the other hand, Canadian military activities in Europe are similarly subject to the provisions of the

Stockholm Document. In a Soviet inspection of a military exercise conducted in Norway this year, for example, Canadian troops were among those inspected.

Our early experience with the implementation of the agreement demonstrates that the provisions of the document have been largely honoured by all 35 participating states in both letter and spirit. The agreement has arguably been extremely useful in enhancing stability and security in Europe by increasing the confidence of the participating countries in one another's military intentions. At the current CSCE Follow-Up Meeting taking place in Vienna, the implementation of the Stockholm Document is being reviewed and discussions are also underway to establish two new negotiations on conventional security in Europe. While one of these would consider ways and means of enhancing stability in Europe at lower levels of conventional armaments, the other would consider new confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) — in other words, continuing the work on CSBMs begun at Stockholm.

In the meantime, the implementation of the accords achieved at the Stockholm Conference must be regarded as an encouraging development by those concerned about conventional security and stability in Europe.

Conventional Arms Control: Stabilizing the Balance in Europe

With the recent intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) agreement eliminating an entire class of nuclear missiles, recognition of the importance of conventional forces within NATO's deterrent triad has in recent years increasingly focused attention on the imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact force levels and capabilities.

One avenue towards reducing the imbalance which NATO has taken has been to build up and to modernize forces so as to improve overall conven-

tional capability. The Long-Term Defence Plan and the three per cent increase pledge are both evidence of NATO's resolve since the late 1970s to improve the conventional balance. Unfortunately, the Warsaw Pact did not stand still: it has not only maintained its conventional superiority in terms of quantity, but it has also managed to narrow the gap in quality, and has thereby enhanced its overall advantage.

The Harmel Report of 1967 recognized the need to address Warsaw Pact con-

ventional superiority, and recommended a "two track" approach to achieving enhanced stability: first, maintenance, as necessary, of a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, and, second, implementation of a policy of détente, which included arms control. The two tracks were to be complementary — not mutually exclusive.

When assessing the balance, force levels must be considered in light of *all* relevant factors — geography, terrain, peacetime deployment of forces,