Smith v. Mason, 17 P.R. 444; and (b) the infants are not entitled to the money in any case.

(3) The plaintiffs basing their claim to the money specifically "in that the indorsement was not read, etc., and was

ignored, etc.," they fail upon this issue as well.

This by no means disposes of the whole matter. The evidence convinces me that, while the transfer is absolute in form, it was in fact but security for advances already made and to be made. The defendant says that he advanced more than the amount paid into Court, and I think I should not order a reference unless the plaintiffs assume the responsibility of asking for one. The cross-examination of the defendant was not apparently directed to shewing that he had not advanced the amount he claimed.

If, within ten days from this date, the plaintiffs apply for an order of reference, such order may go, at their peril as to costs, referring it to the Master at London to determine the amount for which the certificate is security in the hands of the defendant. In that event, I shall reserve to myself the question of costs and further directions until after the Master shall have made his report. If such an order be not taken out by the plaintiffs, I now find all the issues in favour of the defendant, direct the plaintiffs to pay all the costs over which I have control, and order the payment out to the defendant of the amount paid into Court.

On the 9th May, 1912, RIDDELL, J., added the following:—
The plaintiffs accepting the reference offered in the judgment herein, an order will go referring it to the Master at London to inquire and report upon the amount for which the insurance certificate and the assignment thereof are security.

BRITTON, J.

Мау 4тн, 1912.

## MORAN v. BURROUGHS.

Negligence—Permitting Infant to Use Fire-arm—Injury to Playmate—Findings of Jury—Evidence—Contributory Negligence—Damages—Scale of Costs.

Action by James Moran and by his son John Adam Moran, for damages for injury to the latter, resulting, as it was alleged, from negligence on the part of the defendant in permitting his infant son, a boy of about twelve years of age, to have in his