

to secure its co-operation with UN efforts to bring the fighting in Korea to an end, led Mr. Hickerson (of the State Department) to say to Mr. Wrong (the Canadian Ambassador) "that never had the State Department been subjected to such arm-twisting. He said that they would take it from nobody but Canadians!"

Mr. Pearson's qualities of foresight and caring for the future also emerge in his conception of NATO as a co-operating Atlantic community, rather than just as an old-fashioned military alliance, and his efforts to salvage something of the essentials of that community through improved consultations after Suez. Would that the other allies had the foresight to see what Mr. Pearson saw in Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and not allowed the economic transatlantic ties to wither, while expecting continuing American defence guarantees, without the exercise of hegemony over the Atlantic region.

Focus on peace

Above all Mr. Pearson cared about peace. As a son of the manse, he had been brought up to pray for it; but, as he says: "I knew that peace was a policy as well as a prayer." This volume of Mr. Pearson's memoirs, as well as Volume I, reveals the extent that his experience in two world wars, first as a soldier at the front and in the second sharing the vicissitudes of Londoners under bombardment (when, indeed, the front might at times have been a safer place) made the search for "creative peace", as he called it, something like a search for the Holy Grail for him.

In this search, Mr. Pearson not only worked for the strengthening of international organizations at the United Nations, NATO and the Specialized Agencies, such as FAO (of which he was one of the founders); he went out to cultivate understanding and respect for the Canadian point of view through restless travel to many of the world's capitals. These visits, and the frank comments which they evoked in his diaries, make fascinating reading, and have been put to good use by the editors.

The most historic of these visits, to which Mr. Pearson devotes a whole chapter, was his visit to Nikita Khrushchov. It was historic because it came so soon after the death of Stalin and on the eve of Mr. Khrushchov's taking over supreme power in the U.S.S.R. It was also the first visit by a foreign minister from Canada — indeed, from any NATO government. For Mr. Pearson it was a mission of discovery and peace. The fact that it produced the first of a series of major Canadian wheat sales to the U.S.S.R. — for 300,500,000

tons a year for three to five years — was a fringe benefit. What Mr. Pearson was bent on exploring was whether the leadership in Russia was going to be the kind of striving for hegemony that left Europe divided, Korea and India partitioned and NATO standing with periodic crises over Berlin, or whether in the broader interests of survival in the atomic age, there was to be any hope of "peaceful coexistence".

Response from Khrushchov

The response Mr. Pearson obtained from Mr. Khrushchov was ambiguous, to the effect that *détente* must start with the winding-up of NATO or the mission of the U.S.S.R. into NATO which amounted to much the same. As in most of his other international ventures, Mr. Pearson was a Canadian finder in the search for a basis of a deal which has since borne some fruit.

An excerpt from the diary I kept as a member of Mr. Pearson's party in London, I believe, to bring out this point, is in Mr. Pearson's own diary, concentrated in himself — had to say, overlooks (for a luncheon for Molotov at the Canadian Embassy, October 10, 1955):

"The talk around the table kept coming to the theme that Canada should be a bridge between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., using its influence in favour of coexistence and the reduction of tensions. The Minister (Pearson) kept his own end up in the exchange, making it clear that, while Canada realized its position between the two principal world powers, we would not easily fall for Soviet and Malenkov (then PM) in particular was by the Minister's quip that: 'Nothing is more exhausting than friendly pressure.' Speaking to Kaganovich across the table, he said in Russian: 'That was a very shrewd remark.' Malenkov struck me as by far the most attractive personality among the Soviet leaders we met, and I was interested in the remark by the Minister that, in a nuclear war, neither side could expect to escape dreadful devastation, and that should be the point of departure for any negotiation of international tensions. Malenkov said to Kaganovich (again in Russian): 'Did you see that — that's what I've been saying.'"

Enigmatic in his personal relationships, sharing confidences with few, but commanding, by their confidence in him, the devoted support of many —, Mr. Pearson never overlooked the fact that, ultimately, international relations are personal relations. No one put this more clearly than Mr. Pearson himself in his speech accepting the Nobel Prize for Peace: "In the end, the whole problem always returns to the people; yes, to one person and his individual response to the challenges that stand before him. In the response to the situation he has to meet as a person, the individual

Bent on probing directions of Soviet policy under Khrushchov

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