

way, this "measured retaliation" has not yet been put to the test, except as a threat. The threat, however, because of Soviet nuclear retaliatory power, at least opens up possibilities among which Soviet intervention, if it judged its vital interests threatened, cannot be excluded.

43. Considering the prospects of nuclear devastation which the Allies would risk to a larger or lesser degree should this kind of deterrent fail, and the war spread to global and nuclear proportions, it would be highly desirable that consultation between the United States and Canada should precede the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. If hostilities cannot be avoided, every effort should be made to fight limited wars with limited means and limited objectives on the Korean model. This involves not only the choice of weapons and the choice of objectives, but also giving the other side adequate opportunities to understand the intentions of the governments which have undertaken to resist aggression, and an adequate opportunity for negotiations on reasonable terms to bring hostilities to an end.

44. The choice of weapons has an important bearing on whether hostilities, if they cannot be avoided, can at least be limited; the choice of weapons also may be a determining factor in deciding whether the resistance is effective or not. It may be just impracticable, for instance, to atomize the "free Thais" or the "Pathet Lao", even if there may be some Communist Chinese behind them. This is, of course, realized by some observers in the United States. For instance, William Kaufmann of Princeton University, in his book *The Requirements of Deterrence* says: "It is probably hopeless to expect that a single deterrent will cover the entire range of contingencies and still satisfy the criteria of credibility. The attempt to devise such a deterrent is likely to result in either a sparrow hunt with a cannon or an elephant shoot with a popgun." This points to the desirability of maintaining conventional armed forces and conventional weapons as a supplementary means of deterrence, as well as for the purpose of fighting local or limited wars if hostilities cannot be avoided. At the same time, it must be recognized that, at least as far as the United States is concerned, the day is not far off when it will be difficult, if not impossible, to fight a limited war with conventional weapons. United States defence policy is now predicated on the use of small atomic weapons and before long, whenever U.S. forces go into action, they are likely to use nuclear weapons. The possibilities need to be explored of extending the principle of consultation, being developed initially in the NATO context, to other areas, so that nuclear weapons should not be used without some accord with the other countries likely to be affected by the consequences of U.S. action.

45. The possibilities of unilateral action by the United States involving the use of nuclear retaliatory power in limited and local wars may be reduced by the development of the collective approach to defence or local security: A sharing of responsibility for security may be organized through the United Nations, through regional defence organizations, or through the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth, as a special political association with world-wide links of loyalty and tradition rather than common security interests, does not offer a suitable framework for the organization of regional defence. Where Britain, however, has assumed responsibility for resistance to Communist encroachments in a colonial territory which is adjacent to another Commonwealth member whose national security interests are directly involved, special arrangements for defence cooperation may follow as in Anzani.

46. However, responsibilities for building up local defensive strength must obviously devolve primarily on the governments and peoples of each region; organizations which may be built upon the initiative of outsiders will lack firm foundations. For the foundations of any defence structure must be the recognition of mutual security interests, the determi-