

quests are not for the interest of this nation ; that we have already, besides securing our rights, acquired as much, or perhaps more, than we shall be able to retain ;—that an attempt to farther acquisitions can only serve to move the jealousy of other nations, and incline them to side with our enemies.—To this may be added, that if we go on and get possession of the French settlements, and at the same time suffer them unmolested to ravage the continent, their acquisitions may more than counterbalance ours, especially if they make themselves masters of the maritime provinces ; whereas by opposing their progress, and disappointing their views, we leave them nothing (except Minorca) to set off against all our conquests.—Not to mention that were we in possession of the French settlements, the acquisition could be of little use to us, if we suffer them to extend their arms over the greater part of the continent. For in that case, we should be stocked with commodities, without any customers to take them off our hands, but on their own terms.

It will be said, however, that the French can have no just pretence for making such conquests, and some have imagined, that we should have had no war on the continent, but for our alliance with Prussia : but I refer them, for an answer, to the Considerations. It appears from the Considerer's own principles, and they are so far just, that whenever
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