

believed that it would be a sin not to fulfil the vow, the vow is valid." Divine and human laws, and not vows and oaths, settle our obligations to God and man. In our relation with our fellow beings our promises are binding—our vows and oaths do not add to their force.

"Is a vow valid if it has a perverse aim or evil conditions?"

Answer—1, "No, if the bad aim is attached to the vow; for instance, if you vow to give alms in order to steal successfully."

Answer—2, "Yes, if, when the vow is made, one is influenced by good sentiments. It is valid, then, though having a bad cause or evil conditions. For instance: To vow to give alms if one is not caught stealing; because, if to steal is an evil, not to steal is not one, but certainly a gift of God. That is: God protects the thief who steals to be able to give alms." "Now," Gury continues, "the vow does not bear upon evil, but on good, insomuch it is good by itself."

The Jesuit's exegesis on every precept of the decalogue ends with illustrations "offensive through and through," as the Parliament of France, the oldest son of the Church, designated, in 1760, their teaching in all the authors laid before them. I take from Gury the following:—