

Supply—External Affairs

every phase of this project. I wish to acknowledge also the work of M. Michel Côté and his student associates at Laval.

The Canadian overseas volunteers undertaking has been commended by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs. I now call on Canadian businessmen for financial support. It is an investment in young Canada, a modest contribution to people in other countries and a way of promoting good will and international understanding.

On September 19 the next regular meeting of the United Nations assembly will get under way. At the last assembly Prime Minister Diefenbaker said this:

Let us not leave this place without some hope for mankind. Let us instead say to the peoples that death's pale flag shall not again be raised in war, and that fear shall be lifted from the hearts and souls of men.

A year has passed since that speech was made and now there is greater reason for fear than there was last September. There is not really very much to be cheerful about these days; and so I say this: Let us not leave this parliament without doing something in the international community to raise the hopes of Canadians.

Mr. Pitman: Mr. Chairman, as this parliament resumes sitting, it does so in an extremely serious state of mind, perhaps more serious than for many years. We are indeed closer to war tonight than we have been at any time since 1945. The statements of the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of State for External Affairs have given us some indication of the reality of this situation.

The Berlin crisis I think has indeed destroyed one myth. I refer to the belief that we could fight limited wars over matters of vital concern to the great powers. It was some years ago that Mr. Dulles carried through the brink of war strategy in the United States, the strategy of the deterrent. Then the United States changed to a belief that wars could be fought with conventional weapons, that no one would be inhuman enough to bring into action the ultimate in weaponry. However, we now realize that the brink of war diplomacy works both ways, and that we can both blackmail each other with super bombs and with the horrors of our weapons. We have realized with nuclear testing that the threat of nuclear war and the Berlin issue are tied very tightly into one bundle. Tonight as we sit here we realize that one fatal mistake could destroy us that we are indeed but one phone call and one finger away from annihilation. I shudder, Mr. Chairman, when I hear of the extent of the preparedness of the strategic air command, on 24 hour alert, with

bombers always in the air and with the possibility of initiating an attack within seconds. I think the tension of this situation is almost unbelievable and perhaps beyond what human capacity can continue to accept. Indeed, one man has suggested it is statistically certain that if these conditions continue bombs will drop and perhaps sooner than we would care to think.

So we stand tonight on the brink, almost totally inured to the statistics contained in the latest book on nuclear war, namely that the United States has the explosive equivalent of 10 tons of t.n.t. for every man, woman and child on the surface of this earth, sufficient indeed to destroy ten times the number of its people. Perhaps one area in which Canada could make some contribution is in continuing to bring before the nations of this world the horror and the atrocity which a nuclear war would create. I think it is time that we took a second look at nuclear war and thought of winning a war or surviving one. Certainly we want to do everything we can to survive and we congratulate this government upon the suggestions they made this afternoon which will come to pass. But let us not make any mistake about the matter; millions will die.

One cannot read the story of the Berlin issue since 1945 without coming away indeed impressed with its complexity. In a sense, it is a matter of our own sins coming upon us. All of us remember in 1945, as the allied armies marched through Germany, there was a suggestion that we should carry through and capture Berlin. Then as a result of change in strategy—and I do not think we need to bother to assign the blame for this change in strategy—it was decided we would not take Berlin. By that mistake, through failure to realize that the strategy at the end of the last war would decide the problems of the post-war period, we have brought many difficulties upon ourselves. However, we cannot rectify our problems in clouds of radioactive dust.

I think there are two things that could bring war, namely the one I suggested, that fatal mistake, and second emotional oversimplification. I think it is important that we should not misuse history. When we talk of Munich in regard to the Berlin issue we are confusing the issue. Certainly when we talk of Poland, we are doing nothing to foster an understanding of this situation. Would that the issues were so clear as the blatant militarism which brought about the invasion of Poland, even though that indeed would bring upon us the holocaust we desire to avoid. Here we have a situation which has no real precedent in history. We have a divided city, one half cut off by 100 miles