

numbers of men we are sending from Canada to add to her armed strength. In the present war, unlike the last, her sources of food on the continent of Europe have all been closed off by enemy occupation. Canada is the nearest source of food left open. Without our food, the people of Britain might starve. Without our food, the Canadian army in Britain would be a handicap instead of a help. In a literal sense the very lives of the British people and our own armed forces overseas depend upon the exertions of Canadian farmers and fishermen. In prosecuting the war, theirs is no secondary role. As time goes on, the demands upon Canada for supplies of food for the allied forces and, later, for the peoples of the now subjugated countries are certain to increase.

I have mentioned food production separately because I doubt whether the country is fully aware of the vital importance of food regarded as a munition of war. Otherwise, it might well have been included as a phase of the productive aspect of our total effort. It is not in food alone that Canada's war production extends far beyond our own needs. Canada's production of the machines and munitions of war is already developed on a scale which would have been considered impossible two years ago. The other day, the Minister of Munitions and Supply (Mr. Howe) stated that Canadian munitions were being used against the axis on every battlefield and on every ocean. That, surely, is cause for pride, though not for self-satisfaction. It is well to remember that every battle which has been lost in this war has been lost because of the lack of machines; of planes, or tanks, or guns, or ships. The cry we continue to hear from every front is not so much for numbers of men as it is for tanks, for planes and for ships.

In making the machines of war, Canada's productive task has only begun when our own armed forces have been supplied. Except for planes, Canada has been a main source of British supplies, outside Britain herself. Only recently has the United States begun to overtake us. And now the United States has many other urgent demands to meet. Canadian weapons and munitions must help fill the gap made larger than ever by Japan's entry into the war.

Our mines and forests, our foundries and factories, are also helping to supply the other nations of the British commonwealth, Russia, the forces of the other allies, and even the United States. In September of 1939, the government assured parliament that every effort would be made to avoid the useless sacrifice of men because of the lack of modern weapons. Every campaign has gone to prove

how highly mechanized and how heavily armoured an army must become before it can hold its own in present day combat.

While it cannot be said too often that total war demands total effort, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that total effort means using men and resources, where each will count for most, not where their employment will fit in with individual wishes or the wishes of those who have failed to see the needs of our effort as a whole. Too many of those who are talking of total war are measuring Canada's effort, as I have said, in terms of one aspect only.

Both in the short run and in the long run, Canada would weaken the cause of the United Nations by failure to give adequate protection to vulnerable areas in our own territory; or by failure to contribute adequately to the naval protection of the Atlantic passage; or by failure to maintain a formidable striking force in Britain or in whatever theatre of war Canadian troops may serve; or by failure to keep up the air training on which the air strength of the British commonwealth so largely depends; or by failure to provide adequate food supplies and to produce weapons and munitions in adequate volume. All are essential to Canada's war effort. What is equally essential is that our effort shall be in the truest sense a balanced effort. We must not fail in any of these directions. It is only by keeping all these demands upon our man-power and resources in proper balance that our utmost effort will be achieved. It might be added that all this depends upon the satisfactory financing of the entire effort.

In the light of what I have just set forth, I desire briefly to review Canada's record of achievement in the present war. It will be seen that we have developed our effort in all its aspects simultaneously. Equally, we have sought to maintain the proper balance between production and the armed forces and, among the armed forces themselves, between the needs of the navy, the army and the air force. The foundations of Canada's war effort along these lines were laid in the closing months of 1939. At that time, I stressed the importance of preparing for a long and terrible struggle in which staying power, the power to hold out to the end, might well be decisive.

Knowing the importance that, in the minds of many, would be given to an expeditionary force, I pointed out the vital importance as well of an adequate naval and air contribution by Canada. I said that our effort would be concerned in equal measure with the fighting forces at sea, on land, and in the air; that our economic contribution might well prove to be the most important of all; that,