

Since June, therefore, there has been a serious effort to examine the lessons which must be learned from the war in Korea if the United Nations is to be in a stronger position, in future, to meet similar crises. A careful diagnosis of the weaknesses of the organization has been conducted and some remedies have been prescribed.

The first lesson to be learned is that the Security Council, hampered as it is by the constant use of the veto by the Soviet Union, is an inadequate instrument with which to attempt to organize resistance to aggression. The Security Council was able to act effectively in June of this year only because of the accidental absence of the Soviet Representative, who had "walked out" in January over an entirely different issue. There can be no doubt that, but for his accidental absence, the Security Council would have been blocked on this occasion, as it had been in the past. It was therefore clear that some alternative method must be found for organizing collective security against attack, if and when the Security Council failed to discharge the responsibilities which had been given it under the Charter.

The diagnosis also revealed another important source of weakness. Those who drew up the Charter had proposed that military agreements should be negotiated between the United Nations and its member states which would provide national contingents to be at the call of the organization. These agreements, which were to be negotiated through the Military Staff Committee, had never been drawn up on account of the obstructive attitude of the Soviet Representatives in that Committee. As a result, when Korea was attacked, member states, particularly the smaller and middle powers, found themselves without military forces which could be used at once under the auspices of the United Nations to repel the aggressor. The Great Powers which have military responsibilities throughout the world and which, for that reason, have large forces at their disposal were in a position to act. They did so with courage and despatch; and we must acknowledge our debt to the United States especially for the valorous and vigorous way in which it shouldered its responsibilities. Smaller countries, however, like our own, do not wish to default on their share of collective action which may be necessary. But before Canada, and other countries like ours, can be in a position to contribute military force immediately and effectively towards defeating aggression in any far off part of the world, arrangements must be worked out within the United Nations so that we may know what is expected of us. The fact that this had not been done in the United Nations was the second source of weakness which the events of last June laid bare.

On the credit side, it must be noted that the action which the United Nations took against aggression in Korea was made much easier because of the presence in Korea of a United Nations Commission which was able to flash the news of the attack at once to the Secretary-General in an authoritative report. Their presence on the spot enabled the United Nations to cut short argument about the facts and to stigmatize the North Koreans as the aggressor on the basis of unimpeachable evidence.