

weapons, should be declared. There must be provisions for challenge investigations, which would take place when there is serious concern that the Convention has been violated. These investigations should be complemented by a system of visits aimed at building confidence that the provisions of the Protocol are being complied with. Ways should be found to ensure that technology transfers, in keeping with Convention obligations, are promoted. Finally, an organization staffed by professionals should be established to implement the provisions of the Protocol.

States Parties participating in the negotiations hope to complete their work before a Review Conference scheduled for 2001. The Government will move quickly to establish the appropriate legislative and organizational framework to put any new Protocol into force.



In addition to strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention through the negotiation of a Verification Protocol and continuing to support the operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Government should also examine methods of increasing the effectiveness of the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, as well as co-operation in intelligence and law enforcement to prevent terrorist acquisition of such weapons.

Response

There are now 29 participants in the Australia Group; Canada has been an active participant since its creation. The Government firmly believes that it is incumbent on responsible states, and indeed an obligation under the CWC and the BTWC, to ensure that no assistance is given, knowingly or accidentally, to weapons programs. Starting during the negotiation of the CWC, Canada has led efforts in the Australia Group to ensure an effective relationship to the Convention. Moreover, Canada has worked to promote cooperation among Australia Group partners in the areas of licensing and enforcement. The Government has favoured wider Australia Group participation, as more and more states develop the necessary export controls and agree to the principles of chemical and biological disarmament.

The Government has been driving efforts in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) aimed at making it more effective. Indigenous capabilities in countries of concern are growing and not all major suppliers of missile technologies are now a part of the MTCR. Furthermore, advances in technology mean that specialty equipment is not always required; off-the-shelf equipment will often serve. Finally, dramatically improved communications means that technologies move around the world at the click of a mouse. Recognizing this changed context, the Government has been pushing the MTCR to play a more proactive role to address the causes for proliferation as well as to broaden acceptance of the norm against the development of new missile systems.