up as a good minimal example, covering most of the range of issues sought, although not yet with the level of detail desirable. The UK document was cited by several participants as the best provided by the NWS, although it was also noted that the UK's 2003 document was almost identical to its 2002 document, containing virtually no new information. The data on planned reductions provided in US documents was also noted as valuable and a good model to be followed by the other NWS.

Participants stated that there was no sign of co-ordination or even of extensive interaction among the papers submitted by the NWS. Nonetheless, a certain amount of informal interaction was noted. The Russian statement had challenged the United States on the subject of tactical nuclear weapons, for example, while the Chinese statement had challenged the US and other NWS on a number of points. The UK document also could be seen as something of a challenge to the other NWS to increase the amount of detail provided in their statements.

Non-nuclear-weapon States

Participants noted that a number of the NNWS States parties that had reported in 2002 did not report in 2003. Germany, for example, was one of the non-reporters in 2003, arguing that it did not question the principle of continuing reporting, but stating that none of the information in its 2002 report had changed. Participants discussed whether it was better to submit no report or to send a duplicate of a previous one. Most argued that it is important to be seen to be reporting, and that the greater the number of States parties reporting, the more other States parties would be encouraged to follow suit. It was also suggested that most States parties would have new items to report if their all significant initiatives and advocacy efforts were reported. (Germany, for example, had been involved in a number of nuclear-disarmament-related activities worthy of being reported in the period between its 2002 report and the 2003 PrepCom.)

As with the NWS, the "middle four" categories of information were suggested as the most useful categories of information on which to seek reports.

As one participant pointed out, in many cases the delegations of States parties are small, and the same diplomats work on both NPT issues and the small arms and light weapons issue. This would likely to lead to less focus on the NPT and a correspondingly greater need for education on the issue. It might be useful to encourage the understanding that nuclear weapons issues are linked to other weapons issues through the general and complete disarmament provisions of Article VI. The Treaty does not make the achievement of nuclear disarmament dependent on the achievement of general and complete disarmament. But it does oblige States parties to pursue such disarmament, so it would be legitimate for States parties to report what they are doing in this regard. It would also be useful for States parties to report what they are doing to advance non-proliferation.

In addition to these issues, it was noted, NNWS often express concerns or views about universality, security assurances, and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

These factors suggested that many NNWS would also prefer reporting on a broad range of Treaty-