

both are called peacekeeping, the term is generally applied to large-scale operations like that of 1956, in the Congo (now Zaire) in 1960, Cyprus in 1964 and again in the Middle East in 1973 and 1978. The second type comes under the category of observation, such as the deployment of small numbers of troops to a maximum of 600 designed only to observe and report any violations to a cessation of hostilities. Examples are the introduction of United Nations observers between India and Pakistan after the war of 1948 and again in the Middle East after the Arab-Israeli war of 1948.

PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES

The total experience now ranges over forty years. As a result, basic principles and practices have evolved which are to the greater extent based on United Nations experience. They are critical to an understanding of the very nature of peacekeeping; namely what, how, and in what circumstances it can be applied, what it is able to accomplish and what are its limitations.

Firstly, a peacekeeping force is introduced by an international organization or similar auspices as an impartial third party to stand between and to assist in keeping belligerents at bay. Peacekeepers must be neutral. They should not take sides in a dispute. Otherwise the operation would be partisan and unacceptable to one or another of the belligerents.

Secondly, peacekeeping is a non-enforceable measure. This is critically important. It is not intended or designed as a fighting force to impose its will on the parties in conflict. Peacekeepers are authorized to use force only in self-defence. The reasons for this derive from the very nature of the legal structure and political evolution of the United Nations. These are not at all likely to be altered in the foreseeable future.

The fundamental purpose of the United Nations is the maintenance of international peace and security. This specific responsibility was given to the Security Council which is empowered to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces" as may be necessary. Because, however, the Cold War antagonisms and hostility between East and West penetrated the politics of the United Nations from its very inception, the Security Council has been unable to use these powers to fulfill this essential obligation. Any such action requires the concurrence of the five permanent Members: Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union and the United States, which each have a veto in the Council. They have, quite simply, never agreed on the necessity and the utilization of enforcement measures in any crisis situation. The only proximate case was the decision in 1950 to use force to repel North Korean aggression on South Korea. That was possible only because the Soviet Union was at the time absent from the Council and hence unable to veto the resolution.

Peacekeeping has therefore evolved as a low-level

substitute for enforcement action. The Charter makes no reference whatsoever to peacekeeping. Hence peacekeeping operations are not authorized to use force except in self-defence under direct attack. This principle is rigorously adhered to and means that peacekeeping forces are always few in number relative to the military capability of the parties whose cease-fire is being observed, monitored, supervised or secured.

This leads to the fourth principle, namely that of consent. In all cases the parties in a dispute have agreed to the interpositioning of UN forces in specified areas within their own territory. The 'host' countries and the UN in fact sign agreements detailing the conditions under which UN forces operate on their sovereign territory. Not only do these agreements define where the UN personnel can operate, but also what they are permitted or not permitted to do outside the specified zones. Within specified zones the types of peacekeeping are governed by UN resolutions.

The matter of consent raises the basic question as to whether a host country has the right to insist on withdrawal for national reasons before the expiry of the mandate. That is what Egypt did in 1967 when its troops moved into the Sinai desert and advanced toward Israel in contravention of the peacekeeping mandate of 1956. The UN did withdraw, but under much controversy. War ensued.

Then, after the war between Egypt and Israel in 1973, a second contingent, United Nations Emergency Forces II (UNEF II), was introduced. The mandate says that UNEF II shall continue in operation, if required, provided the Security Council so decides. But the matter has never been tested. UNEF II was withdrawn in 1981 when it became evident that the Soviet Union would veto any resolution renewing the mandate. UNEF II was therefore replaced by a Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), a new hybrid outside the auspices of the UN, and created under the leadership and direction of the United States with the agreement of Egypt and Israel.

The fifth principle relates to the matter of composition. Which states are willing and able to contribute contingents to a UN force? What are the political and possible financial advantages or disadvantages? Then there is the principle of consent which suggests that the host country should have the right to accept or reject a potential contributor. Generally this principle is adhered to, although Israel objected to Polish troops in UNEF II in the Sinai and in UNIFIL on the Golan Heights. Although the UN insisted on their participation, Israel has not permitted Polish personnel to enter Israeli-held territory, complicating UN operations. For similar reasons there are no communist states which contribute troops to UNFICYP in Cyprus.

The overriding factor, however, is the general principle that peacekeeping forces should be composed