

and as a further means of strengthening the regime's legitimacy, has a similar effect. National pride, in the Russian instance, appears to revolve around the presence and manifestation of military power and the quest for equality of status in military and therefore (in the Soviet view) diplomatic power. Statements by the Soviet leaders,¹² as well as the changing definition of the role of the Soviet forces,¹³ suggest that one of the perceived attributes of this equality of status is the Soviet Union's active participation in Third World conflict and conflict resolution. As in the case of ideology, what is equally or more important than the expansion of Soviet influence and prestige is the maintenance of positions already established; this avoids the damage to national dignity associated with serious reversals. Parenthetically, it is germane to note that since Khrushchev the difficulty of abandoning established commitments has made the Soviet Union loth to assume new ones where its capacity to sustain them is in question. The principal national as well as ideological rival of the Soviet Union is once again the United States. Soviet leaders tend to measure their own performance by reference to that of the United States, and nationalism as a guide to policy is liable to be particularly strong where Soviet and American interests collide.

This consideration of the expansion of Soviet power into the Third World — whether in order to defuse or counter threats from the West, or for ideological or national reasons — brings me finally to a derivative source of Soviet policy in the Third World. To establish Soviet military power in distant regions requires a structure of support facilities — naval bases and port privileges, airbases or aircraft landing rights, storage facilities, and such like. These must be in reasonable proximity to areas of deployment in order to maximize the effectiveness of the forces deployed. Mounting and sustaining a substantial military presence in the Third World requires the cultivation of close relations with states which are capable of providing these requirements.

Soviet strategy in the Third World is not, however, merely a product of Soviet motivations. It does not operate in a vacuum, but it is shaped by a variety of internal and external constraints. In the first

¹² L. Brezhnev (1970), as cited in R. Kolkowicz, "The Military and Soviet Foreign Policy", in R. Kanet, ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980's* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 17. See also A. Gromyko (*Pravda*, 4 April, 1971).

¹³ A. Grechko, "Rukovodyashchaya Rol' KPSS v Stroitel'stve Armii Razvitogo Sotsialisticheskogo Obshchestva", *Voprosy Istorii KPSS (Questions of the History of the CPSU)* (1974), #5, p. 39.