




View of Kulturhuset in downtown Stockholm, site of the Stockholm Conference. Flags of Conference participants can be observed on roof of building.

past each other. The prospects for agreeing on meaningful cooperative action do not seem bright. We have failed to set up a basic negotiating equation, or what others have called a negotiating framework — and, without it, and in fairly short order — we shall never be able to come to grips with the myriad of details facing us in the critical area of military affairs; without a basic decision soon we shall never be able to come to grips with these specific problems in the time remaining to us.

The policy — indeed the philosophy — underlying the measures which my Delegation has co-sponsored is clear. We seek a programme of cooperative action based on informing and verifying, in other words, a coherent system, a compendium of information and verification measures. We believe that only in this way can confidence be built. Confidence rests on deeds, not words.

At the very outset of this Conference, we gave our objectives a preliminary concrete formulation by proposing measures through which the participating States could inform each other of their intentions and verify them with a view to building mutual confidence. We have spelled out this policy in further detail through a series of working documents. We later consolidated these documents in the form of an amplification of our

original proposal in order to give a clearer and more precise impression of our approach to confidence-building, thus to facilitate negotiations. During recent weeks, we have gone one step further towards this end by illustrating how the participating States could exchange information in annual calendars, how military activities could be effectively observed and how they could be verified by on-site inspection.

In recent weeks our policy of seeking to build confidence through concrete measures seems to have elicited a response from some of our partners. After months of emphasis on unverifiable declarations of good intent, some sketchy concrete measures have finally been tabled, presumably in accordance with proposal SC.4*, which envisages the elaboration of additional confidence-building measures, more significant and broader in scope than those in the Final Act. We are continuing to study these proposals, although in some cases they contain parameters that are hardly more significant than those in the Final Act; certainly not significant enough to warrant the considerable effort this Conference, in its totality, represents. In other cases, these newly presented measures seem to seek unilateral advantage, and in still other

* proposal by the Soviet Union

cases, they would involve military activity outside Europe, which would only lead this Conference into an endless and fruitless debate.

My Delegation has repeated often that we do not believe that words alone will inspire confidence; we do not believe that static declarations of good intentions are enough. But in an attempt to define a negotiating equation, we have recognized that it would be appropriate to reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or the use of force. It could be a reflection of the very barriers to these actions which we seek to establish through measures of information and verification.

We have thus tried to set the stage for a balanced and meaningful negotiation. But we have seen little sign that some of our partners are willing to take a corresponding step in meeting us half way. The possibility of the out-of-garrison concept serving as a comprehensive definition of ground-force activities which should be notified has not won general acceptance. Similarly, we have yet to come to grips with the need to define the threshold for notification in structural terms which could be effectively identified, observed and verified. While a broad consensus seems fortunately to be emerging in acknowledging the fundamental importance of contributing to the building of confidence through information and verification, a detailed discussion of how this principle should be applied has eluded us. This is all very discouraging.

The sixth session has focused on concrete measures, and that is all to the good as far as it goes. But it has not redressed the negotiating equation which remains lopsided with a clear policy and a clearly articulated objective on one side, and on the other, a clever and carefully orchestrated display of tactics. This is what discourages me.

We have been given a chance at Stockholm to make the revitalization of the process of *détente* a practical possibility: to show that it can be done. Let us not throw this chance away by playing the tactical game too long."