

case, the Seigniors were intended to form a body of gentlemen—a defence also to the colony—having authority to make under-grants of small parcels of land under certain conditions, for their own emolument or benefit. This is just as clearly expressed as that the Seminary *did not* receive their donations for any such object, but *for the conversion and civilization of the Indians*, and not only a part but the whole; and moreover that in case of increase or excess of revenue, such increase or excess was to be employed in like manner. I have no doubt in my mind but that the concessions were not only asked and granted for the benefit of the Indians exclusively, as long as they choose to stay there. As Mr. J. J. McLaren, Advocate of the Civil Rights Alliance in the legal questions between the Indians and the Okas, showed, “according to the laws of the Province of Quebec at the date of the concession deeds, as well as at the present time, the Indians were constituted and are still *gréés de substitution* with all the rights attached to that quality. The Seminary, as *appelés à la substitution*, have no right whatever, except that of supervision to prevent waste,” and in this, the privilege of securing for themselves a sufficient maintenance and no more.

In the “Historical Notice of the difficulties arisen between the Seminary and the Indians of Oka,” published by authority of the former in 1876, a very ingenious epitome of the original Deed is given, to establish its absolute ownership. Coming *ex cathedra*, it is its own condemnation, and shows its lack of honesty on the face of it. A certain gentleman is proverbially accused of citing Scripture for his purpose, and in much the same way has the Seminary quoted the Deed. I will point out this in my next paper.

That there may be no unfairness, I give a correct translation of the Deed of Ratification by the French King, of 1718, reserving the continuation of my remarks for another article.

W. GEO. BEERS.

DEED OF RATIFICATION.

This twenty-seventh day of April, one thousand seven hundred and eighteen, the king being in Paris, and desiring to be propitious towards the ecclesiastics of the Seminary of St. Sulpice, established in Paris, from whom these of the Seminary of St. Sulpice established at Montreal proceed, and to whom the Sieurs de Vaudreuil and Bégon, Governor and Lieutenant-General, and Intendant of La Nouvelle France, have granted by Deed of Concession, on the seventeenth of October, one thousand seven hundred and seventeen, a tract of land of three leagues and a half in front by three leagues in depth, to enable them to transfer the mission of the Indians of Sault au Recllet, which is under their care, and this on the terms, provisions, and conditions mentioned in the said Deed of Concession, which Deed of Concession His Majesty caused to be laid before him to be approved in favour of the ecclesiastics of the Seminary of St. Sulpice at Paris, and solely on the conditions which are to be mentioned in these presents. His Majesty, by and with the advice of Monsieur le Duc d'Orléans, Regent, has given and granted by and in virtue of these presents to the ecclesiastics of the Seminary of St. Sulpice, established in Paris, that certain tract of land containing three leagues and a half in front, to commence at a brook which runs into the great bay of the Lake of Two Mountains, ascending along the said lake and the River St. Lawrence, by three leagues in depth, the said piece of ground being mentioned in the said Deed of Concession of 1717, in order to transfer there the mission of the said Indians of Sault au Recllet; to have and to hold the same for ever unto the said sieurs ecclesiastics, their successors and assigns, even if the said mission be taken away from thence, in full property, under the title of fief and seignior, with the right of superior, mean, and inferior jurisdiction; with the privilege of hunting and fishing as well within as opposite the said concession, on condition that they shall bear the whole expense necessary for removing the said mission, and also cause a church and a fort to be built there of stone at their own cost, for the security of the Indians, according to the plans thereof, which shall be by them handed over to the Governor and Intendant of La Nouvelle France, to be by them and with their report sent to the Council of Marine for His Majesty's information, and to be approved, which works they shall be held to perform within the space of seven years, subject also to the condition of fealty and homage (*foi et hommage*) which the ecclesiastics of the said seminary, their successors and assigns, shall be held to perform at the castle of St. Lewis, in Quebec, and which they shall hold under the customary duties and dues, and agreeably to the custom of the Provostship and Viscounty of Paris, followed in La Nouvelle France, and that the appeals from the decisions of the judge who may be established at the said place shall lie before the judges of the Royal Jurisdiction of Montreal. That they shall keep and cause to be kept house and home (*feu et lieu*) on the said concession. That they shall preserve their oak timber fit for shipbuilding, which may be found upon the land which the said ecclesiastics shall have set aside for their principal manor house, and that they shall also stipulate the reserve of such oak timber within the extent of the private concessions made or to be made to their tenants, which said oak timber His Majesty shall be free to take, without being held to pay indemnity; also, that they shall give notice to the king or to the Governor and Intendant of La Nouvelle France, of the mines, ores, and minerals, if any be found within the limits of the said fief, and leave necessary roads, ways and passages. That they shall concede the said uncleared lands under the simple title of a rent of twenty sols and a capon, for each and every arpent of land in depth, and six deniers of cens, and that there shall not be inserted in the said concessions any sum of money or any other charge than that of the simple title of rent, His Majesty granting them, nevertheless, the permission to sell or grant at a higher rent the lands of which a quarter will have been cleared. The present Deed of Ratification to be registered in the Superior Council of Quebec, for the use of all whom it may concern, and in testimony whereof His Majesty has commanded me to draw up these presents which he has been pleased to sign with his own hand, and countersigned by me, Joint Secretary of State, and of his commands and finances.

(Signed,
(Signed,)

LOUIS.
PHILYPIAUX.

LET THEM ALONE.—All would be well, it is urged, if they would but let the people alone. But what chance is there, I demand of these wise politicians, that the people will ever be let alone; that the orator will lay down his craft, and the demagogue forget his cunning? If many things were let alone, which never will be let alone, the aspect of human affairs would be a little varied. If the winds would let the waves alone there would be no storms. If gentlemen would let ladies alone, there would be no unhappy marriages, and deserted damsels. If persons who can reason no better than this, would leave speaking alone, the school of eloquence might be improved. I have little hopes, however, of witnessing any of these acts of forbearance, particularly the last, and so we must (however foolish it may appear) proceed to make laws for a people who we are sure will not be let alone.—*Sydney Smith*.

WAR AND REFORMS.—How easy it is to shed human blood—how easy it is to persuade ourselves that it is our duty to do so—and that the decision has cost us a severe struggle—how much in all ages have wounds and shrieks and tears been the cheap and vulgar resources of the rulers of mankind—how difficult and how noble it is to govern in kindness and to found an empire upon the everlasting basis of justice and affection!—But what do men call vigour? To let loose hussars and to bring up artillery, to govern with lighted matches, and to cut, and push, and prime—I call this, not vigour, but the sloth of cruelty and ignorance. The vigour I love consists in finding out wherein subjects are aggrieved, in relieving them, in studying the temper and genius of a people, in consulting their prejudices, in selecting proper persons to lead and manage them, in the laborious, watchful, and difficult task of increasing public happiness by allaying each particular discontent.—*Sydney Smith*.

A MODERN 'SYMPOSIUM.'

THE SOUL AND FUTURE LIFE.

[Having given the articles of Mr. Frederic Harrison on *The Soul and Future Life*, we now propose to give the “Symposium” which followed in answer. In it the whole question is viewed in its varied aspects by some of the ablest Theological, Scientific and Philosophical writers and thinkers of Britain.—EDITOR.]

The imaginative glow and rhetorical vivacity which are visible throughout Mr. Harrison's Essays on ‘The Soul and Future Life’ are very remarkable, and should guard those of us who recoil in amazement from its creed or no-creed from falling into the very common mistake of assuming that the effect which such ideas as these produce on ourselves is the effect which, apart from all question of the other mental conditions surrounding the natures into which they are received, they naturally produce. It is clear at least that if they ever tended to produce on the author of these papers the same effect which they not only tend to produce, but do produce, on myself, that tendency must have been so completely neutralised by the redundant moral energy inherent in his nature, that the characteristic effect which I should have ascribed to them is absolutely unverifiable, and, for anything we have the right to assert, non-existent. There is at least but one instance in which I should have traced any shade of what I may call the natural view of death as presented in the light of this creed, and that is the sentence in which Mr. Harrison somewhat superfluously disclaims—and moreover with an accent of hauteur, as though he own or his creed's responsibility for the fact of death. ‘We make no mystical or fanciful divinity of death,’ he says (July, p. 836); ‘we do not deny its terrors or its evils. We are not responsible for it, and should welcome any reasonable prospect of eliminating or postponing this fatality that waits upon all organic nature.’ After reading that admission, I was puzzled when I came to the assertion that ‘we who know that a higher form of activity is only to be reached by a subjective life in society, will continue to regard the perpetuity of sensation as the true Hell,’ (p. 841), a sentence in which Mr. Harrison would commonly be understood to mean that he and all his friends, if they had a vote in the matter, would give a unanimous suffrage against this ‘perpetuity of sensation,’ and, so far from trying to eliminate or postpone death, would be inclined to cling to and even hasten it. For, in this place at least, it is not the perpetuation of deteriorated energies of which Mr. Harrison speaks, but the perpetuation of life pure and simple. Indeed, nothing puzzles me more in this paper than the diametrical contradictions both of feeling and thought which appear to me to be embodied in it. Its main criticism on the common view of immortality seems to be that the desire for it is a grossly selfish desire. Nay, nicknaming the conception of a future of eternal praise, ‘the eternity of the labor,’ he calls it (p. 841) a conception ‘so gross, so sensual, so indolent, so selfish,’ as to be worthy of nothing but scorn. I think he can never have taken the trouble to realise with any care what he is talking of. Whatever the conception embodied in what Mr. Harrison calls ‘ceaseless psalmody’ (p. 838) may be—and certainly it is not my idea of immortal life—it is the very opposite of selfish. No conception of life can be selfish of which the very essence is adoration, that is, wonder, veneration, gratitude to another. And gross as the conception necessarily suggested by psalm-singing is, to those who interpret it, as we generally do, by the stentorian shoutings of congregations who are often thinking a great deal more of their own performances than of the object of their praise, it is the commonest candour to admit that this conception of immortality owes its origin entirely to men who were thinking of a life absorbed in the interior contemplation of a God full of all perfections—a contemplation breaking out into thanksgiving only in the intensity of their love and adoration. Whatever else this conception of immortality may be, the very last phrase which can be justly applied to it is ‘gross’ or ‘selfish.’ I fear that the Positivists have left the Christian objects of their criticism so far behind that they have ceased not merely to realise what Christians mean, but have sincerely and completely forgotten that Christians ever had a meaning at all. That Positivists should regard any belief in the ‘beatific vision’ as a wild piece of fanaticism, I can understand, but that, entering into the meaning of that fanaticism, I cannot understand, but that, for it as a gross piece of selfishness, I cannot understand; and I think it more reasonable, therefore, to assume that they have simply lost the key to the language of adoration. Moreover, when I come to note Mr. Harrison's own conception of the future life, it appears to me that it differs only from the Christian's conception by its infinite deficiencies, and in no respect by superior moral qualities of any kind. That conception is, in a word, posthumous energy. He holds that if we could get rid of the vulgar notion of a survival of personal sensations and of growing mental and moral faculties after death, we should consecrate the notion of posthumous activity, and anticipate with delight our ‘coming incorporation with the glorious future of our race,’ (p. 838), as we cannot possibly consecrate those great hopes now.

But, in the first place, what is this ‘glorious future of our race’ which I am invited to contemplate? It is the life in a better organised society of a vast number of these merely temporary creatures whose personal sensations, if they ever could be ‘perpetuated,’ Mr. Harrison regards as giving us the best conception of a ‘true hell.’ Now if an improved and better organised future of ephemerals be so glorious to anticipate, what elements of glory are there in it which would not belong to the immortality looked forward to by the Christian—a far more improved future of endlessly growing natures? Is it the mere fact that I shall myself belong to the one future which renders it unworthy, while the absence of any ‘perpetuity’ of my personal ‘sensations’ from the other, renders it unselfish? I always supposed selfishness to consist, not in the desire for any noble kind of life in which I might share, but in the preference for my own happiness at the expense of some one else's. If it is selfish to desire the perpetuation of a growing life, which not only does not, as far as I know, interfere with the volume of moral growth in others, but certainly contributes to it, then it must be the true unselfishness to commit suicide at once, supposing suicide to be the *finis* of the glorious future of our race, so I suppose it must at least be postponed till our own sensations have been so far ‘perpetuated’ as to leave heirs behind them. If Condorcet is to be held up to our admiration for anticipating on the edge of the