

solute, at once gives way. Hildebrand, from whom Papal aggression dates its course, seeing the Germany of his day enfeebled by feudal anarchy, trampled on the Emperor, and when the Emperor resisted, filled the country with civil and parricidal war; but that same Hildebrand swallowed with the utmost tranquillity the proud answer of William the Conqueror to the demand that he should do homage for his kingdom. John was weak as well as wicked; and for his weakness, not for his wickedness, he and his kingdom were reduced to a vassalage which, if the Popes could have wrought their will, would have been the lot of all kings and nations. Edward I. was not weak, and he, having to deal with a similar question, settled it promptly and for ever. Bismarck has, at all events, shown the hollowness of the bugbear, and taught us that the guardians of national and civil rights have only to be firm in the defence of their trusts. The extension of the conflict to other countries would be calamitous, but if we wish to avert it, we must not tempt aggression.

Most people would be relieved by hearing that the man given up by Scindiah is not Nana Sahib, but about the twenty-first involuntary claimant of that undesirable name. We do not want a sanguinary renewal of the evil memories of the mutiny, the less so since the Diary of Lord Elgin and other too credible testimony has shown that the balance of atrocity was not ultimately on the side of the mutineers. The massacre perpetrated at Delhi by Nadir Shah is one of the horrors of history. But Lord Elgin has endorsed the statement that the British reign of terror was worse. This is a heavy price to pay for Empire, at least in the case of a Christian nation; and the missionary must be eloquent who can persuade the people of Delhi that the religion of the conqueror is the religion of mercy.

The tendency of victorious parties and

especially of parties victorious in civil wars to abuse their victory, grow unpopular and fall, is so invariable that it may be almost called a physical law. The case of the Republican party in the United States has been no exception to the rule. By dallying, as they unquestionably did, with the anti-republican project of a Third Term, Grant and his office-holders have brought to its climax the public indignation, already raised to a great pitch by years of abused patronage, jobbery, support of carpet-bagging iniquity in the South and general misrule. The best men of the Republican party had struggled hard to obtain timely reforms; but they had decisively failed, and they now probably acquiesce, if they do not rejoice, in the punishment which has overtaken those who disregarded their wise and patriotic counsels. Not that Grant himself is a bad man; probably he has always wished to do right; the corruption with which he has been personally charged by the fury of party amounts at worst only to indelicacy; and in vetoing the Currency Bill he proved that when he clearly saw the path of duty he would take it. But his only proper sphere is war, and even in that he is a mere sledge-hammer. Like the Duke of Wellington, and even in a still greater degree than the Duke of Wellington, he wants the amplitude and flexibility of intellect which enabled Cæsar to pass without loss of ascendancy from the camp to the Senate and the Council Board. He is not less ignorant of political character than of the science of politics; and the attempt which, to his credit, he made in the formation of his first Cabinet to rid himself of the political hacks and party managers totally failed from the absurdity of the appointments which he tried in their place. A successful dry-goods merchant was named (though from a legal impediment he could not be appointed) finance minister, and the navy was consigned to a personal friend and a pleasant dinner companion. At the same time Mr. Washburne, Grant's old political