

ments by sea. What I mean by a formula is this: a principle established into which figures might afterward be written by the final Conference; a principle established upon which limitation could be based.

Now it must be remembered that the various great powers of the world have each for themselves a distinct and separate necessity for naval defense. The problem as respects France is different from the problem as respects Great Britain, and the problem as respects either France or Great Britain differs in its aspects from the problem as respects the United States.

To this Preparatory Commission, in March, 1927, Britain came with the framework of a treaty. France came also with the framework of a treaty, but the principle embodied in the French formula was wholly distinct, one might say antagonistic, to the principle embodied in the British formula. Great Britain came and asked that the treaty take the form of a series of commitments binding each signatory to keep its armaments within a certain maximum for each of the various classes of vessels. The classes were divided into nine, and under it each nation would be compelled to keep the standard of its ships and the total tonnage of its armament within each class to a certain maximum to be fixed by the final Conference. In a word, the principle was that the limitation should be by categories, and in so thorough a way as to include nine categories altogether.

France, on the other hand, took the view—her problem being different—that there should be one grand total fixed, and that within that grand total of tonnage allotted to each separate country—different perhaps for different countries—the nation should be permitted to build its armaments of whatever character it desired, whether all capital ships, all cruisers over ten thousand tons, all submarines; might be able, in a word, to allot its construction to whatever one of the nine categories it cared to, so long as the total maximum was not exceeded. This was known as the "Global" principle, and to it France adhered with much tenacity.

At this sitting the United States was represented, Japan was represented and Italy was represented. The United States took the British side of the argument and was anxious for

limitations to be based on the principle of categories, so much for each of the nine. There was some little difference in detail of application but no difference in principle whatever.

In this respect, while I refrain to quote, it is only to save time, the exact quotations can be given from the speeches of the various representatives to confirm what I say. Italy took the view of France and took it without qualification whatever. Japan, while not so identically as the United States, decided for the British view. There was a distinct and a rather determined conflict; and struggle as they could, no compromise could be reached.

Again they met, in the month of March, 1928.

France had brought to this meeting a compromise suggestion. It was to the effect that instead of there being nine categories there should be four, and that a certain maximum should be allotted for all, for each of the categories, but that any nation could subtract from one category and add to another, provided it gave one year's notice to the League of Nations in advance. This was a real compromise, but it would have enabled that country, or any country—were it adopted—to have transferred all its construction work, say, to submarines or to some other category; and though it was suggested that there might be a maximum placed upon submarines, the compromise suggestion of France was rejected by Great Britain; and I think I can say—in fact, I know I can say—that in that rejection the United States concurred.

Britain later made a suggestion, too, but inasmuch as it was not accepted by France it is unnecessary for me to detail its terms tonight.

The question now before the Commission was whether it would be possible at a second regular sitting, or, as they called it, a second reading, to get to a formula which all would accept or whether, in despair of success of such an enterprise, it might not be better to carry on negotiations between the various countries with the view of ascertaining if something could not be done that way. At that meeting—in the month of March or in April, 1928, the United States representative was present also, and the United States representative agreed with the view expressed by France—that it would be better to carry on nego-