

only to conceal disagreement and prevented the parties from facing up to the need for genuine compromise, then perhaps our efforts might better be used in some other direction.

9. The fact seems to be that whether this policy of being a midwife for happy resolutions was a good play for Canadian policy or not, the play no longer works. The delegations which have traditionally produced compromises did, to some extent at least at this session, pursue their usual practices, and other delegations took for granted that this was the pattern of a debate. Scandinavians, the Japanese and we ourselves, however, seemed somewhat weary of the game. Perhaps we felt that we had now exploited the language of compromise. A more important factor was a hardening of the attitude of the two sides. The major Western Powers showed as little willingness to compromise as did the Russians. The Indians and Yugoslavs were very active in the compromise game but less effective. The most important factor in the defeat of these compromise moves was probably the fact that the Indians, for reasons of personnel as much as anything, have lost the confidence of the Western Powers and are not much respected by the Soviet Union. Trusted by neither, their traditional role in the Assembly is undermined, to the disadvantage of themselves and the Assembly. The Asian and African countries in general are, furthermore, feeling stronger and are less disposed themselves to accept evasive language for the sake of agreement. They know that the power of the Western countries to achieve a two-thirds majority or even, in some cases, the blocking third, is failing and they are less disposed to give ground.

10. The United Nations is going through a period when the balance of power is shifting and many members will have to adjust their policies to new conditions. The major Western powers have taken for granted that the automatic majority which they could achieve on major issues is not only natural but right and proper. They have denounced the Soviet veto in the Security Council as immoral but they have refused to recognize that, in Soviet eyes, the automatic majority is a veto of similar kind. (The American argument that this is a voluntary majority reflecting the views of the greater part of mankind may be true, but it is not seen in that light by the Russians.) Not only the Russians but the Asian and African countries have resented the automatic majority which the West could achieve on colonial issues. The realization of their greater power is making the opposition to the West rambunctious. The Russians are now making it quite clear in the Assembly, in their attitude towards Geneva negotiations, and even in things like their attitude towards the nationality of controllers in a nuclear test control system, that they will no longer put up with allowing the United States to call on its reliable friends to enable it to out-vote the Soviet Union. Hence the demand for "parity" which is now paralyzing much useful United Nations activity. Regardless of our pleas, the Soviet Union is not going to accept United Nations organs set up on the old basis of representation. We may or may not ignore their boycott, but we cannot solve any of the world's major problems without Soviet participation. The realization of this fact hung like a cloud over the past Assembly and accounted to some extent for the depression.

11. Related, of course, to this fact is the fact of China. There was a time when we could persuade the Communist Chinese to have informal relations with the United Nations over Korea or over the prisoners-of-war. This they are no longer prepared to do. It is becoming increasingly obvious, therefore, that no major issues of the Far East can be solved in the United Nations and that it would be extremely difficult, furthermore, to tackle general issues like disarmament without the participation of Peking. At the same time, there is a growing realization that this problem cannot be solved by a simple gesture of voting to seat the Communists. The finding of a solution will be a process which could itself wreck the United Nations. The admission of Peking would further upset the traditional balance of power in the Assembly; the disposition of the representatives of Taipeh is a question for