

**"ACCIDENT"—DISEASE CONTRACTED FROM HANDLING INFECTED WOOL.**

*Higgins v. Campbell* (1904) 1 I.L.B. 328, may be noted as giving a legal definition of an "accident." The plaintiff was a workman engaged in a wool combing factory, and in the course of his employment had contracted anthrax from handling wool infected with the anthrax bacillus. The question was whether this could be said to be "a personal injury by accident" in the course of his employment. The County judge who tried the case thought it could not; but the Court of Appeal (Collins, M.R., Mathew, and Cozens-Hardy, L.J.J.), following *Fenton v. Thorley* (1903) A.C. 443, held that it was "an unlooked for mishap, or an untoward event not expected or designed," and, therefore, an accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897.

**LEASE—COVENANTS—ASSIGNMENT OF REVERSION—LIABILITY OF ASSIGNOR OF REVERSION ON COVENANTS IN LEASE—32 HEN. 8, C. 34, SS. 1, 2.—(R.S.O. C. 330, SS. 12, 13).**

*Stuart v. Joy* (1904) 1 K.B. 362, was an action brought by lessees against their lessor for damages for breach of a covenant contained in the lease. The covenant was one which ran with the land, and the lessors had assigned the reversion, and the simple question was whether they remained liable on their covenant notwithstanding the assignment, and the Court of Appeal (Lord Halsbury, L.C., Lord Alverstone, C.J., and Cozens-Hardy, L.J.) held that they did, and affirmed the judgment of Wright, J., in favour of the plaintiff. Cozens-Hardy, L.J., says: "I assume, in favour of the appellants, that the covenant to execute repairs on the demised premises in obedience to the award to be made was a covenant running with the reversion to which the statute 32 Hen. 8, ch. 34, (R.S.O. c. 330, ss. 12, 13) applies. If so, s. 2 (Ont. Act s. 13) gives the lessees a right of action against the assignees of the reversion for breach of the covenant. But it is difficult to see why the enactment should release the lessors from the express covenant. There is nothing in the language of the section to lead to this conclusion."

**LIQUOR LICENSE ACT—KEEPING OPEN DURING PROHIBITED HOURS—LICENSING ACT, 1874 (37 & 38 VICT. C. 49) S. 9.—(R.S.O. C. 245, S. 54).**

*Commissioners of Police v. Roberts* (1904) 1 K.B. 369, was a prosecution under the Liquor License Act, 1874, s. 9, for keeping open the license premises during prohibited hours. The evidence