

# THE NEW CHINA

(This is the fourth of a series of articles by T. W. Hu, of the Gest Chinese Research Library, McGill University. The writer, who will give in the near future a series of open public lectures at McGill University about China and things Chinese, is the author of "The Case for China: the Abolition of Special Foreign Privileges and Immunities," a monograph responsible in part for the passing of the Porter resolution in the American Congress urging President Coolidge to revise treaties with China on the basis of equality and mutual right. He is a graduate of Tsing Hua College, Peking, and has studied extensively in a number of leading universities in the United States. The views set forth by Mr. Hu are, of course, his own, and are presented as such in the publication of his articles, of which the first appeared in The Gazette of January 28th, the second on February 4th, and the third on February 11th).

## IV

### Chinese Nationalism and International Relations.

Altogether there are thirteen nations (if we except Belgium, Mexico and Spain, whose treaties have been abrogated and have not yet been replaced by new ones) whose relations with China are in a peculiar state, in that they are based on treaties of an unequal and non-reciprocal character, namely, Brazil, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, France, the United States, Japan, and Great Britain. The first mentioned eight are not so important in Chino-foreign relations, just as they are not important in world affairs at large. Neither are Italy and France so important, on account of the smallness of their interests in China, and I am even inclined to relegate the United States to an inferior position in my discussion, merely because there is not much prospect of a war between her and China. It is true that, as the recent adventure of the State Department in Nicaragua well evinces, the American Republic is embarking more and more upon undertakings of a morally hazardous character; nevertheless, I think that there is still enough of the old-time idealism left in the Yankee's bosom to make his identical interests with Nationalist China count in determining the status of Chino-American relations for some time to come. I have not forgotten about the American share in the ultimatum of 1925 on account of the Taku incident, nor her part in the bombardment of Nanking in 1927, but it can hardly be denied that the traditional friendship, amounting to a passion at times, between the two sister republics on both sides of the Pacific, is too strong, too great, too beautiful, too charming, too unique, to be so easily dissipated amidst a few ripples in the big ocean of international diplomacy. Of all the elderly gentlemen at the helms of various Governments last spring, Mr. Coolidge was probably the only one really scared at the spectacle of the "murderously anti-foreign uprisings," but his New York declaration that he would pull nobody's chestnuts from the fire was most timely to thwart the well-propagated chauvinistic plan of an "international co-operation" to crush "a young and chaotic nationalism" in China.

In Chino-foreign affairs, Japan, of course, occupies a very important position, partly because of her geographical proximity, and partly because of her interests in China. Her policy towards China, because of the "Twenty-One Demands" point of view which adheres to her most tenaciously, despite her much-vaunted liberalism in recent years, (and it would be sacrilegious to turn around the statement and say that Japan adheres tenaciously to that point of view because she has her own difficult problems craving for solution—the problem of surplus population and the like.)

The recent Japanese policy towards China is well summarized by Professor Goforth, my colleague at McGill, in the following way: "While the Wakatsuki policy of 'Hands off China' in 1926 and 1927 is in very marked contrast to that of Okuma and his 'Twenty-One Demands' in 1915, yet Baron Tanaka's statement of April 22, 1927, and the statement issued by the Japanese Department of Foreign Affairs on May 28, 1927, indicate a number of qualifications and reservations, including: (a) The right to protect her subjects in China by military strength; (b) That the 'right to preserve peace in the Orient generally' vitally concerns Japan (seeds of a Far-Eastern Monroe Doctrine!); (c) Insistence upon the consequences of 'Japan's legitimate economic development' as far as China is concerned; (d) 'Japan cannot remain indifferent to Communist activity in China'; and (e) 'Japan is willing to co-operate with the Powers, after taking into consideration the character of the particular problems involved, the appropriate time, and the proposed measures to be taken'."

The unpleasantness of her relations with China during 1915-1922 has led Japan to resort to an ostentatiously generous policy in regard to China in general; but on the other hand, she seems firmly bent upon strengthening her iron grip on Manchuria, which she has from time immemorial regarded as a heaven-sent sphere of influence of her own. Resting her claim on the infamous Twenty-One Demands, which lack even to this day the legal sanction of the Chinese, Japan has persistently refused to return, upon the expiration of their leases, Tiaotung, with its great ports—Dairen and Port Arthur—and the railways of South Manchuria, and has continued to enjoy a monopoly—in fact, if not in name—of the Fengtien coal and iron beds. Although she had conceded in the Washington Conference that the right to build railways in Manchuria should be shared with a Consortium of the Powers, she nevertheless caused rails to be laid, in connection with the South Manchuria Railway, north from Taonanfu for a line specifically fixed as one to be built by the Consortium. By thus concentrating her energies in the exploitation of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and meanwhile supporting China's nationalistic wishes elsewhere, Japan is hoping no doubt that she may recover the confidence of the Chinese without losing any material gains in the long run.

Her abolition of postal service in China, her restoration of Tsingtao and the Shantung railway and other privileges in that province, her tacit acceptance of the abolition of the various spheres of influence, her withdrawal of Group V. of the Twenty-One Demands, her lending of moral support to China in the Geneva Opium Conference and on certain issues in the Tariff Conference, and a few friendly gestures in the form of

public utterances, and diplomatic statements—these constitute about all the price which Japan has paid in this endeavor to seek a measure of cordiality in Chinese sentiments; and for this she has cast around to look for fat compensations in the Eastern Provinces, where she has maintained with consistent efforts, even at the cannon's mouth, a puppet "dictator" to facilitate the carrying out of her grand scheme. But, "in the development of Chinese sovereignty there will not be room for the obvious political corollaries of the sweeping economic activities which Japan now exercises in that region. Either Japan will have to restrict herself to purely economic enterprises or she will have to annex that region. So long as the Chinese continue to believe, as they do today, that Japan contemplates—given the time and circumstances—the annexation of a portion of Chinese territory, Japan will find it difficult to bring about that cordiality of relations which today she is seeking so consistently." And at present she has definitely put herself a step backward from that goal of cordiality by forcibly halting Nationalist advance in Shantung last summer during the campaign for the capture of the northern capital of China, and the boycott, as a result of that "unavoidable measure of self-defence," is still on, though not in such grave dimensions as in 1915 to 1919. With an ultra-conservative party dominating the councils of the Tokio Imperial Government and with a notorious Japanese protégé safely deposited within the sacred precincts of a Peking Palace, there is every temptation for the old-time "Twenty-One Demands" policy to crop up again; and, as the newspaper reports have it, the Japanese are pressing hard upon the Chang Tso-Ling "Government" with the Twenty-Second Demand for the fulfillment of whatever portions of the old series have been left intact on the docket in face of an unfavorable world opinion. The futility of such efforts, I have no doubt, will be declared by the Chinese Nationalists sooner than the Japanese ever can realize; but a Chino-Japanese rapprochement, on any assured basis, will have to be the affair of the next generation, when Japan shall have awakened from her subjectively sweet dream (in which she has indulged too prodigally in the past!) of militaristic imperialism and machiavellian diplomacy.

No less important a contender for the Chinese pork-barrel is Great Britain, and she deserves this place of honor, not only by virtue of the foremost position in the China trade which she has been able to hold ever since the seventeenth century, but because of her ever-readiness, in her dealings with that country, to take her first and last refuge in the gunboats and in the shelling of unfortified and defenceless cities. British diplomacy in China has found no severer and yet no juster critics than the British themselves. Mr. J. R. Clynes, a noted progressive thinker in the conservatism-stricken Isles of Great Britain, said: "If the British Government had used its brains more and its naval and military power less, we might by this time have had a settlement of the Chinese difficulty." But they had not; and so the "Chinese difficulty" remains.

When the famous East India Company was enjoying its sway in the Far East, it forced opium upon China against the protest of the Chinese Government. At an estimated £6,000,000 per annum from this illicit trade was flowing into England. When China sought again to prevent the importation of opium, British warships were placed at the disposal of the East India Company to enforce its purposes in the ignominious war of 1840-1842, and again in a similar war of 1856-1861. Thus amidst cannon-booms and fires was ushered in the modern era of close relationships between China and Great Britain; and the latter's policy during this whole period, which endures even to this day, has always been "Commerce (whether legitimate or illegitimate!) and Force to Enforce Commerce." And ever since the wave-ruling Britannia showed herself to be stoutly determined to rule the waveless Yangtze, the indignities that she has chosen to heap upon China are of a sort that have left a bloody wound in every Chinese heart.

Simultaneously, she has pursued a parallel policy of diplomatic quibbles, culminating in the now famous memorandum which Sir Austen Chamberlain made public in London on the Christmas day of 1926. This document, being the last and latest public announcement of Great Britain's China policy, deserves our close analysis. It advocates practical recognition of the Nationalist Government, elimination of foreign control, readiness to negotiate a revision of the treaties, amendment of the extra-territoriality system and immediate levy of the Washington Conference surtaxes for the benefit of China. Sir Austen, with child-like innocence, annexed for it the name of "A New Policy"; but, as a policy, it is very old; indeed, it is the sail-trimming policy of making ebullient promises with no promise for their liquidation. With monotonous consistency it has been pursued in the past; and whenever a new lip-service is rendered it, it is called new policy. When the enlightening Emerson put forth the curt remark that there is in this world "nothing new, nothing true, and nothing matters," he must have meant exclusively the British type of China policy. And I have no doubt that when it is called new again, there will be a world-war going around us.

"The past twenty-five years may be called the period of 'international quibbling.' After a century under the foreign heel, the Chinese, in the Boxer uprising of 1900, showed that the worm was turning. The British were the first to head. Even at a time when the British brass-caps were burning down palaces and mistreating women in Peking, the British Government was proclaiming an 'open door' policy to 'maintain the territorial integrity and administrative sovereignty' of China. But the peace protocol of 1901, drafted by the powers that had intervened to subdue the Boxers, imposed large indemnities and huge humiliations upon the Chinese; and 'the British Mackay Treaty of 1902 was a quibble, as were similar American and Japanese treaties the next year. They promised relinquishment of extra-territorial privileges when the Powers felt warranted in surrendering them. But the Powers did nothing then or later. Again, in 1917, a frenzied endeavor to get China into the European War, or, as they said, 'to counteract German propaganda in China,' caused the British Government to make another series of promises, and this despite the fact that she had shortly before made a secret treaty with Japan guaranteeing her a paramount position in Shantung and a train-portion of special interests in other parts of the

country. Having sold China directly to Japan at Versailles in conjunction, of course, with other powers and in accordance with President Wilson's famous Fourteen Points, which they had agreed upon as a basis of peace-making in the Conference! Great Britain came to Washington and made her next last series of diplomatic promises in the treaties of 1922.

"They made promises for a future but did next to nothing. Four years later, when a partial lifting of restrictions on Chinese tariff administration was undertaken, the proposals not only were inadequate but came too late." Finally, quibbling of her own handiwork—such notorious incidents as the Shanghai massacre, the Shamed slaughter, the Wansheng bombardment (all of which took place within a year and a half!), she turned around and spent another five pounds in sending her yearly message of "goodwill to men." The significant silence that the British Foreign Office has maintained in regard to that Christmas document ever since the split of the Kuomintang has established its opportunist character beyond the peradventure of a doubt; and the fact that other governments may have been equally guilty in this respect does not at all change that character of the China diplomacy of Great Britain, as "the senior author of our unequal international status and the guide of the diplomatic body in maintaining it." The familiar enough argument that the Chinese have only themselves to thank on account of their internecine warfare for the unfulfilment of past promises need perturb no one, as there is every sober reason to believe that the Chinese, a race of magicians as they were, could not have had the magic power to prevent the British Government from giving up whatever it wanted to give up.

The unexcelled Mackay Treaty of 1902 has given to every British Foreign Minister a legacy of opportunist policy—and the Chinese of growing diplomatic intelligence have at last become aware of it, so that when Sir Austen's empty cannon-shot came forth in December, 1926, to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of that policy, they not only regarded it with a lukewarm attitude, but even dared to suspect a definite manoeuvre of British imperialism. The fact that that document was issued under the pressure of a devastating boycott that had been going on in Canton for two previous years, and said to have cost the Hongkong merchants a million dollars a day, together with the fact that the immediate beneficiary of the increased surtaxes would have been Sun Chuang-Tang—a redoubtable pattern of virtue with the British, whom he had unflinchingly favored, then in control of the lower Yangtze provinces, including the greatest Oriental port, Shanghai—undoubtedly renders the Chinese suspicion more than plausible. If suspicion has become a tradition with the Chinese in re British policies, then the main-spring of that tradition will not be found in the imputed Chinese ignorance of the docket-contents in No. 9, Downing street, but in their undoubted acquaintance with the overt acts of that stately mansion's average human occupant.

Now, how far away the unexploited child of Chinese nationalism at present stands from the apparently obliging but really invidious fold of British and Japanese imperialism can, I trust, be somewhat gathered from the preceding passages. But before taking leave of this article, let me make yet another point. During the anti-British boycott referred to above, the strike committee in Canton incultured most diligently a lesson to the British people, the Chinese

and a fact that the British people, who are our friends, but merely against the British imperialists, who are our enemies." With the same spirit that inspired that boycott, I have written this article—and I hope that my foreign friends will not find it necessary to frown at a man who never believes in using words to conceal his thoughts for a frank and unflattering statement of the truth, I mean the true status of Chinese Nationalist feeling. What I have said is what I have to say—not what I like to say.

Furthermore, it is by knowing the true Nationalist sentiment that we may hope to solve the problems presented by that sentiment. The redeeming feature in the whole situation is the Nationalists' knowledge of the growing consciousness on the part of the foreign Powers that a strong, united, satisfied and confident China would be of far more fundamental benefit to them, and of the fact that the majority of the foreign peoples, as individuals, are and have always been sympathetic with their legitimate aspirations. It is by no means a herculean task for the Powers to reshape Chinese sentiment into something favorable to them. It rests entirely with them through a mere change of point of view (and I shall dwell upon this point at some length in my last article). To enlist the friendship of Nationalist China, Japan has the unique advantage of a common culture; and today, as in the past, her people are studying the Chinese civilization more studiously than the Chinese themselves do. There is, perhaps, no sounder and more solid basis of amicable intercourse than that of a mutual cultural understanding. With a new-enfranchised democracy, Japan should have no difficulty in turning the enthusiastic esteem of the liberal Chinese Nationalists to good account, both from her own and from the world's point of view. As Mr. Teurumi, a noted Japanese publicist, has well pointed out in his speeches in Montreal, the only solution of Japan's manifold problem lies in industrialization, the old attempt at colonization having proved a dismal failure, as evidenced by the comparatively stagnant character of the Japanese population in Korea, Formosa and other such places. For the purpose of industrialization Japan would have to procure from China minerals and foodstuffs; and both of these she could get without any resort to an offensive policy of political imperialism for which she has displayed such an amazing predilection in the past. There is no essential difference—far less fundamental hostility—in interest between the two most hopeful countries of Asia.

In regard to Great Britain, the Chinese Nationalists remember with gratitude that to her they owe the inspiration for the first Reform Movement of 1898, the inception of modern China; that to her they owe the life of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, the Father of our Nation; and that it is