

the real intentions of the Soviet Union and of the sincerity of the desire of Soviet leaders to reduce international tensions. With the best will in the world, it cannot be said that the eighth session has been marked by any basic change in Soviet actions. The House will be well aware of the difficulties in getting the political conference started in Korea. In other fields Soviet spokesmen and their satellites have persisted in their traditional positions, as, for example on the disarmament issue; or have continued to use the Assembly as a platform for their usual propaganda lines, as in colonial questions or on the issue of Charter revision.

The Soviet Delegation insisted in putting on the agenda near the end of the session an item on international tension. But the way to reduce international tension is not to talk about it; it is to tackle, in a spirit of co-operation, the practical difficulties and current problems which face us. There is as yet no concrete evidence that the Soviet Union is willing to act in this way.

This was especially true on the question of disarmament. When this matter was debated in plenary meeting last spring the co-operative attitude adopted by Mr. Vyshinsky caused many of us to think that possibly the Soviet Union had begun to think that it should not be too inflexible in its attitude. Some people began to feel some hope with respect to this very important problem so far as the attitude of the Soviet Union was concerned. But the position taken by Mr. Vyshinsky at the eighth session of the General Assembly clearly indicated that the U.S.S.R. had no intention of giving way on any of the points on which they have insisted in the past, including a one-third reduction of armed forces. Moreover, under a Soviet resolution on international tension submitted to the Assembly, which deals in part with disarmament, the implementation of a general disarmament programme would be a subject reserved to the Security Council with the result that again the Soviet Union could use its veto rights. In other words, we were faced with a return by the Soviet Union to the original intransigent attitude which it has consistently followed on the disarmament problem ever since it was first considered many years ago.

On the western side Canada, together with 13 other countries which are or have been members of the Disarmament Commission, with the sole exception of the Soviet Union, sponsored a resolution which in our view avoided any provocative or controversial language. The main purpose of this resolution was to ask the Disarmament Commission to continue its work and to make an earnest effort to end the deadlock which has prevented any progress in this field.

I need not emphasize here that in the present state of international relations the Western world cannot afford to deprive itself of its strongest weapon before being convinced that the Soviet Union is ready to accept all the implications of effective international control of atomic energy, including of course continuing supervision of national territories. Moreover, the security of the West requires that the problem of atomic weapons be considered as a part of the general problem of disarmament. Western acceptance of the prohibition of atomic weapons can only take place within the context of a balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, including, conventional as well as atomic weapons. As yet there has been no indication that the Soviet Union is prepared to meet us on these fundamental points.