weapons; the second provides for improvements in existing telecommunication links between Washington and Moscow ("the hot line"), using satellite relays. The most significant development, however, was the joint announcement on May 20, 1971, that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to concentrate in the next year or so on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and that, together with this agreement, they would agree on "certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons". The announcement also implied that, at a later stage, the ABM systems agreement and the interim "freeze" on certain offensive systems should be followed by "further negotiations to limit all strategic arms". Canada welcomed this announcement as an indication that some progress had been made, but it is not yet known how long it will take to translate this understanding in principle into agreements.

Nuclear-Weapons Testing

Progress towards the achievement of an agreement to ban nuclear-weapons testing underground (to complete the Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which prohibits tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water) has been complicated, in part, by the deadlock between the United States and the Soviet Union on verification. The United States has insisted since the opening of negotiations in the late 1950s on the need for some obligatory onsite inspections to try to clarify ambiguous seismic events that cannot be classified either as earthquakes or tests by seismological means alone. For its part, the Soviet Union has insisted (since 1962) that on-site inspections are unnecessary and unacceptable.

To date, the two major nuclear powers have been unwilling to explore the middle ground between themselves or to undertake serious negotiations in search of a solution. Despite this lack of progress, useful technical work has been submitted to the CCD by Canada and other members in an effort to clarify aspects of the seismological verification issue. The studies by Canadian experts tabled in the CCD have tended to demonstrate that, with improved techniques and equipment for seismological monitoring of an underground test ban and with international co-operation in seismic-data exchange, the dimensions of the long-standing verification problem can be sharply reduced.

Although three resolutions were introduced at the twenty-sixth General Assembly concerning underground tests, it was only the resolution sponsored by Canada that received very large support and was addressed directly to seeking a solution to the problem and difficulties. The Canadian resolution focused on the following objectives:

- (a) assigning priority to the underground test-ban issue in the CCD next year;
- (b) seeking to have the two major testing states resume negotiations, which have been suspended for over eight years, and to submit to the CCD specific proposals for an agreement that could lead to a solution of the verification problem; and
- (c) advocating reciprocal measures of restraint to reduce testing pending the achievement of a complete test ban.