

building. Analysts also need to strive for generality, even as they infer lessons from specific cases particularly the rich history of the CSCE/OSCE. In the absence of a carefully generalized account, it becomes too easy to dismiss confidence building as an idiosyncratic Western product with only limited relevance in other parts of the world. Growing out of this concern, however, accounts of confidence building should be open to the experience of other application contexts. Finally, in their efforts to develop accounts that have policy relevance, analysts should be careful to highlight the sorts of conditions that should exist before confidence building is attempted and to identify key processes that must occur in order for meaningful changes in security relations to result.

A better understanding by policy makers of the strengths and limitations of confidence building is essential to ensure that they make the most productive use of this security management approach and do not become disillusioned because of the approach's misapplication. Fostering this understanding requires more policy-relevant research including case studies of new application examples as well as generic studies of the confidence building process itself. Policy makers and analysts, particularly in new regional application areas, need to work closely to ensure that the explanations of confidence building make sense from a policy perspective and accurately capture what really occurs during successful confidence building.

Confidence Building in the Arms Control Process: A Transformation View suggests some of the issues that should concern analysts and policy makers as they pursue this goal.

In efforts to develop more effective, policy-relevant understandings of confidence building, two diverse concerns must be carefully balanced. On the one hand, these understandings should have a sound conceptual foundation that can provide practical guidance for policy makers. On the other hand, analysts and policy makers should try to remain open-minded about new confidence

building possibilities and new interpretations of how particular confidence building processes actually function.

In a related vein, the transformation view suggests that we should be open to exploring the connections between traditional confidence building and approaches that seek to develop similar functional results in the realm of non-traditional security concerns. In this context, we should also be willing to explore approaches that seek to expand existing security institutions that already exhibit substantial cooperation and coordination in both the traditional and non-traditional security realms.

(4) Recognize the Importance of Supporting Conditions and Foster Them Where Possible

Perhaps one of the most important policy implications to emerge from the transformation view is the need to appreciate that confidence building will work *only* when the necessary supporting conditions exist. This means that confidence building cannot be imposed before potential participants are ready for change. Vigorous and perhaps well-intentioned efforts to encourage confidence building solutions — particularly ones that concentrate on the *use* of CBMs rather than encourage a confidence building process — are unlikely to be successful. Analysts should work diligently to identify the exact nature of these supporting conditions and whether they can be encouraged by state or non-state actors. Some conditions may be more amenable to influence than others. A corollary deriving from the importance of these supporting conditions and the limited ability to influence some of them is that the timing of confidence building initiatives matters very much.

The supporting conditions discussed in Chapter 4 include:

- (1) A sense of "security management fatigue";
- (2) A more focused sense of unease with *status quo* security policies;