

not in a European publication, that it was concerned with East-West rather than purely European reconciliation, suggests an underlying interest, consonant with with reform tendency, in encouraging United States participation in an overall stabilization of East-West relations. That its moderate tone and unusually pragmatic approach succeeded in creating something of a stir among the attentive American public may also have indicated to Moscow a potential responsiveness to a new initiative for "a lasting normalization of the East-West relationship."

As might be expected, Chussudovsky's account of the Genoa policy is to some extent a tendentious one. It plays down the residual element of anti-imperialist "struggle" in Soviet actions. It says nothing about the Rapallo fallback position. And it takes the Soviet "pacifist programme" largely at face value as a set of practical proposals intended for implementation rather than to gain influence over the politics of foreign policy-making in the West. Indeed, it could be that Chussudovsky is one of those who take a legal-institutional view of negotiation as a matter of pragmatic bargaining to achieve national interests. In any event, his discussion of the need for "bold and comprehensive...schemes of East-West cooperation of the kind which Chicherin adumbrated at Genoa" includes proposals for a concerted attack on problems of production and trade, transport and