

independent proposals for an Arctic-wide variant. These are found to be not only unrealistic, in terms of their likely acceptability to the Superpowers (as well as to other circumpolar states), but also questionable in terms of their inherent desirability. It is noted that certain nuclear-related installations in the Arctic, such as ballistic missile early-warning radars and communications and navigation facilities, notwithstanding their possible application to aggressive, "war-fighting" strategies, may nevertheless be indispensable to the effective functioning of stable nuclear deterrence. More to the point, the Soviet Union necessarily relies to a critical degree on its Arctic territories for the basing of the most secure element of its nuclear retaliatory force, its ballistic missile submarines. It would be in the interests of neither the Soviet Union nor the West to compromise the relative invulnerability of these forces by the application of arbitrary geographic restrictions. Furthermore, to the extent that Arctic ice-covered waters provide a haven of sorts for these vessels during routine peacetime patrols or in a crisis, the use of at least portions of this region for their actual deployment should be positively encouraged — quite the antithesis of a NWFZ!

After thus calling into question both the feasibility and desirability of an Arctic-wide NWFZ, the paper goes on to examine more modest yet still potentially useful measures to limit the "excessive militarization" of the region. Truly comprehensive demilitarization — analogous to that already in effect for Antarctica — is dismissed on much the same grounds as the NWFZ concept. However, given the growing attention being paid to anti-submarine warfare activities over, on and under the Arctic ice-cap, it is suggested that now may be a good time to revive a proposal, originally offered by Canadian political scientist Franklyn Griffiths in 1979, for a "partial demilitarization" (covering the ice and surface waters) of the central Polar Basin. Such a measure could have the beneficial effect of constraining the ASW threat to ballistic missile submarines in the area, while proving relatively "negotiable" to the Superpowers given the still early stage of developments (other than those involving attack submarines) in this respect.

The last category of arms control proposals considered in the