

ance of forces in the region"; "to adopt a calendar of reduction with an eye to the elimination of foreign military advisors and other foreign individuals who are participating in military or security activities"; "to identify and eradicate all forms of support, encouragement, and financing for or tolerance of irregular groups of forces involved in the destabilization of Central American governments"; and "to establish direct communication mechanisms for the purpose of preventing and resolving incidents among states."

Excellent examples of technical Confidence-Building Measures can be found in the 1975 Egyptian-Israeli Accord on the Sinai. Article IV of that Accord called for the withdrawal of Egyptian and Israeli forces from a sizeable Sinai buffer zone, the stationing of limited forces and equipment in adjacent zones and the creation of a number of early warning facilities in the region to be manned by Egyptians, Israelis, and American technicians. The United Nations Emergency Force was also to play a role in the buffer zone. The "U.S. Proposal for an Early-Warning System in the Sinai" and the "Annex to the Sinai Agreement" contained the details of various measures. The U.S. Proposal called for the creation of two surveillance stations, one to be operated by the Egyptians and one to be operated by the Israelis, each to have a complement of American personnel to "verify the nature of the operations of the stations and all movement into and out of each station." The Proposal also called for the creation of three tactical early warning watch stations in the Mitla and Gidi passes of the Sinai. These were to be manned by U.S. civilian technicians. In addition, three unmanned electronic sensor fields were to be established at both ends of the Gidi and Mitla passes. The Annex detailed the specific lines and areas covered in the Accord, specified the forces and armaments that were to be allowed within the areas adjacent to the buffer zone, and guaranteed aerial surveillance for all parties. The 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty superseded some of these arrangements.⁸

There are other potential examples of Confidence-Building Measures (for instance, the use of American, British, French and Italian troops as "peacekeepers" in Beirut, the verification and reporting components of numerous draft treaties for disarmament, and various test bans and moratoria) that could be added to this already extensive list.

Recalling the composite characteristics of Confidence-Building Measures noted earlier in this chapter – they were described as measures of a political and psychological nature intended to assist in the correct interpretation of adversary intentions, to reduce uncertainties and (sometimes) to constrain the opportunities for surprise attack – it should be clear that some of the agreements, treaties, accords and arrangements noted above clearly qualify as or contain CBMs. The Sinai early warning and observation system is the most obvious case. The SALT agreements have some very visible CBMs. (The recognition that national technical means (satellites as well as aerial and terrestrial listening posts) would and should be used for verifying compliance of various SALT agreements; the agreement that their legitimate operation ought not to be impeded; and the establishment of the Standing Consultative Commission to air questions about compliance all count as relatively unambiguous Confidence Building Measures.) The various "Hot Line" agreements would seem to qualify, as would the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas. So too would the various agreements designed to prevent accidental nuclear war (such as The Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, The Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War or The Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Nuclear War). Numerous proposals noted above con-

⁸ See Lester A. Sobel (ed.), *Peace-Making in the Middle East* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1980).

