

nected with the Province, which has been paid for by the Dominion."

Tabular statements* showing Dominion expenditure on account of, and revenue contributed to the Dominion by the Province, year by year since 1872, are included in the Memorandum. Under "Expenditure" there are 38 heads; under "Revenue," 27.

Lord Watson† and others have pointed out that the object of the British North America Act was neither to weld the provinces into one nor to subordinate provincial governments to a central authority; but when the central authority is so exercised that the revenues from one province, which needs all its resources, are used to reduce the debt of the Dominion, while that debt is swelled by expenditures in other, and less needy, provinces, it must be evident (even if there were no other illustrations, and there are many) that the provincial independence and autonomy which, Lord Watson tells us, were intended to be preserved by the Constitution, are not preserved: that the theory of the Constitution and the practice of the Dominion Government (that is, of the central authority) are widely at variance.

Lord Watson's dictum presents to the mind the picture of a Dominion consisting of a group of autonomous provinces, each working out its own political salvation after the manner of free peoples; while a central authority prescribes regulations for matters in which uniformity is essential (the postal service, e.g.); adjusts interprovincial relations and fosters the national spirit. This is a rough outline sketch of the Dominion, as the Constitution, its interpreters tell us, intended it to be. The Dominion as we have it is a country in which the tendency is more and more to add to the power of the central authority and to reduce the provincial governments to the status of municipal councils. We have a continual conflict, more or less pronounced, of authority and responsibility, while the manifest evils of a di-

vided jurisdiction (such as waste and circumlocution) are more rather than less emphasized as time goes on. The provinces are hampered and circumscribed to an extent that must seriously retard their development; while the central authority, attempting to manage administrative details in such a "far-flung" territory as ours, is peculiarly liable to suffer from corruption and incompetence.

A good deal might be said about certain provisions of the Constitution other than those here particularly dealt with—such as the disallowance power and the "general advantage of Canada" provision—which, to say the least, seem calculated to put difficulties in the way of working out the Constitution according to the interpretation of the law lords; but the present purpose is served when it is pointed out that Canada cannot possibly become what it should become as a nation unless either the practical working of the Constitution is made to accord with the theory, or the theory is so changed that it will be necessary—in order to get the practice into accord with it—simply to push that practice at once and openly to its logical conclusion. We must have such amendment of the Constitution as will give us either provincial autonomy fully developed, or the unquestioned and complete authority of a central government; a mosaic of both will not do.

The latter plan has been already condemned by inference, nor does it seem worth while to discuss it seriously. One might almost as sensibly suggest a repetition of the disastrous experiment of crown-colony government.

The great barrier in the way of adopting the former plan is that radical error in the Constitution which it is the purpose of this article to point out. That error is in the fiscal and related provisions. All revenues should be paid into the provincial treasuries, and the central authority should be maintained by subsidies (per capita) from the provinces.

It may be objected at the outset that this would simply substitute a new set

* B.C. Sess. Papers, 1901, pp. 568A, 568B.

† 61 L. J., P. C., page 77.