

stead of expressing the wishes of the people, but with fatal facilities of evasion, and no Maine law machinery for making it effectual, such as the destruction of the liquor." It was in its source and origin, as well as in its scope and methods, quite the opposite of a Maine-law. The Gin Act allowed the manufacture and sale of spirits, imposing a duty only upon the sale—the Maine-law prohibits the manufacture for sale, and destroys the liquor so manufactured as contraband. The law of Maine, the prototype of the one we advocate for Britain, originated with the people, was forced by the people upon the government: the one to which the objector compared it originated with the government, and was forced upon the people against their wishes, and without any antecedent preparation! In its spirit and constitution, therefore, it does not bear the slightest analogy to the Maine-law.

The objector had asserted that prohibition was the social development, by "inexorable logic," of the doctrine involved in a pledge. Now, by the way, what was this pledge, of which so much has been said?—Neither it, nor the temperance agitation, have "failed"—however often the platitude may be uttered. In what sense has the pledge failed? Has Christianity failed, because it has not converted the world? Has moral suasion failed, because all men are not moral? Has the law failed, because it is not always obeyed? Each of these agencies does what human instrumentality can do, under given conditions, and it can do no more. Neither can the Maine-law do more; and it does not follow that there is any failure in the matter. The objector, as a physician, ought to have known better than that. When a physician gives, for a specific disease, a specific medicine, it does not follow that that medicine must cure all diseases, or be deemed a "failure." Every agency is needed of a true kind. Christianity will do its work—and the temperance society will do its work likewise. We are not advocating some panacea—some one exclusive thing that is to cure everything—we want all good things united, in order to get rid of all bad things. The reason why the pledge is kept, over a course of years, only by a certain number, is because the temptations of the traffic, and of custom, overcome the principles of men—not because the pledge is bad. It is foolish for people to talk as if the pledge made the obligation—it only expresses an obligation already admitted in the conscience. Man has a double nature—he is not merely an intelligent, but an impulsive automatic being. As the objector admits, "he knows the right, but still prefers the wrong." We teach him in school and lecture-room what is right, and then, by chartered institutions, tempt him to what is wrong! Hence the delusion of expecting that mere education will preserve men right, while circumstances incline them to what is evil. People, sir, may declaim against being made sober, moral, or religious by act of parliament—but what we object is, that in the licensed traffic we have a machinery which makes men drunken, criminal, and irreligious by act of parliament. What we want is, not something positive, but something negative—we want the parliament of the people to undo something mischievous, and to protect us against the workings of an evil system. Prevention is surely both wiser and cheaper than either counteraction or cure.—And this brings me to consider.

III. THE FALLACIES OF GENERAL THEORY. Under this head, the objector profess-

es to "grapple at once with the fundamental principles of government and society." But in reality, he does no such thing; he contents himself with eulogizing Moral Suasion and disguising the principle of Fear. But government is at best only a supplement to moral suasion; for if it were sufficient, by itself, government would be quite unnecessary. If the objector understood his subject he would perceive that while as men and Christians, moral suasion is our only instrument—as citizens we must use something over and above. To deny this, is to deny the fundamental principles of society—an argument that proves too much. Moral suasion, no doubt, would do very well if we were in heaven or the millennium; but we are not in heaven, nor quite angels yet; and in the meanwhile, therefore, we are just human beings with such human passions implanted in us by the Creator as he deemed best for earth.

The objector is really for an impossible improvement; arguing (if anything) that fear is needless! For our part, I believe that we have no superfluous passion—degrading or otherwise. True, we ought not appeal to fear when love will serve. And law did not do this. Law does not terrify me—because I have no intention to transgress it. It is to the honest and good, non-existent—"a terror to evil-doers" certainly, but "a praise to them that do well." This was a point strangely overlooked. Remove the fear of the law from the weak or the wicked, and the temptation to do wrong was virtually increased. I have seen much of the world—and been in many countries and many cities—and my experience teaches me that where the arm of the law is weak, and moral suasion is most alone, licentiousness and outrage are most rampant. Fear—low as it is—conjoined with law, is the breakwater which prevents the surges of anarchy and barbarism from sweeping over the conquests of civilization. What, indeed, would men generally care for virtue, if vice had no disagreeable consequences of which they were afraid? To quarrel with "fear," was to quarrel not only with the constitution of man, but with the Providence of God. For my part, I am not ashamed of introducing into my jurisprudence, an element that is essential to the laws of supreme wisdom. True human law should be a copy of true Divine Law, let a shallow and pretentious philosophy deride it as it may.

Under the head of remedies, the objector proposes to substitute the working of some other passion for the desire of strong drink. Now, in reality, man, as man, has no desire for strong drink; it is altogether an artificial and unnatural craving that will die out if you will let it, and does not, therefore, need to be substituted by something else. People talk as if God had left us unfinished in our faculties, or without some natural object for their development and exercise. It was a great mistake. I undertake to say, with reference to this substitutionary doctrine, and without opposing innocent recreation, that you will not find in history—ancient or modern—the example of any one community that has ever been reformed by mere amusements. I have seen cities in the Transatlantic States,—such as New York,—where amusements measure the profligacy and intemperance; and I have seen quiet country places, where with an absence of amusement, sobriety, morality, and happiness abound. It is the same on the continent. The gayest cities and countries are the most intemperate and immoral: and vice

versa. Excitements go together—and drink sustains the worst of them. Some amusements, if disconnected with drink, may be useful—but they are never, of themselves, either preventive or reformatory. Men are not so made as to be fiddled into morality, or dunced into temperance. But, whatever value recreations may have, they are neither the direct nor necessary—much less the legislative—remedy for drunkenness, pauperism, and crime. Facts tell us, clearly enough, what is the sufficient remedy. I know many parishes in Britain where there is no tipping shop; and what are the consequences? In these places there is no pauperism, and weeks or years may pass without once meeting with a drunkard or a criminal. Against these facts, what is the theory urged by our opponents? "Put away drink by law, and men will make themselves drunk somehow." Well sir, we say here, that when magistrates and proprietors have put drink away by law, people don't make themselves drunk anyhow. Take away the public house, and you take away most of the drunkenness and consequent evils—all theories to the contrary notwithstanding.

The objector says of the Maine-law of America, that "he must either doubt its success or see in the fact another terrible truth!" But no one who reads can doubt the success of the prohibitory law now effectively executed in all the New England States, save one, and in some other parts besides; and the facts of diminished police, lessened rates, empty poorhouses, and goals to let, can have no terror to any man who is not under the disturbing influence of a theory and a prejudice.—People may question as they please, sir, but doubt solves nothing—and happily alters nothing. In 1853 I was cognizant of the working of prohibition in Massachusetts and Maine where, out of Boston, I never saw a drunken man during a tour of many days. Certain it is, that during that time I saw several forged notes offered at the bars, but I did not see one glass of drink sold in any hotel. I notice,

IV. THE FATAL CONCESSIONS OF THE OBJECTOR.—He "does not wish to argue against restraints, because they are matters of expediency." Of course they are. All law is a question of expediency, which shall be done to prevent such cases occurring again—or reducing their number to the minimum? It is a question of expediency whether we shall have a Maine law—and of justice too. When society gets its foot into difficulties—when some of its members will steal, garotte, and murder—it is a very pressing question how to get out of the danger and reduce it to the smallest point.

The objector says—"Let them appeal to men's reason and sense of justice, rather than their fear." But we appeal to all three; and find the triads of motives all too little. Hence our strong conviction that prevention will be very expedient—a prevention that goes to the cause of crime, and lessens the need of applying fear so frequently. But it is strangely forgotten, that to cease to suspend the sword of the law over the head of the intending criminal, would be to extend the terror of crime over the innocent community. When these sentimentalists prate about moral suasion, they forget that the real question they have broached is, whether there should be law or not? Scripture, I perceive, is quoted for strong drink—aye, and for sanitary regulations which were sustained by more stringent legal suasion, in the shape of penalties, than I am prepared to annex to a Maine law. So in