

RULERS OF ENGLAND.

First, William the Norman,
Then William his son;
Henry, Stephen and Henry,
Then Richard and John,
Next, Henry the Third.
Edwards one two, and three;
And again after Richard,
Three Henrys we see.
Two Edwards, third Richard
I rightly guess,
Two Henrys, sixth Edward,
Queen Mary, Queen Bess;
Then Jamie the Scotchman,
Then Charles, whom they slew,
Yet received after Cromwell,
Another Charles too,
Next Jamie the Second,
Ascended the throne;
Then Good William and Mary,
Together came on;
Then Anne, Georges four,
And fourth William all passed,
And Victoria came—
The best though the last.

As the first part of the detached account of the Autumn Manœuvres appeared in our issue of last week, we think it right to publish the following synopsis of "the general idea of the campaign" which is copied from the (English) *Observer*.

A careful study of it with the help of a map will show that the savage criticism lavished on H.R.H., the Commander-in-Chief, was to use every description of Yankee slang, mere newspaper gas.

(From the *Observer*.)

Nothing has been a more fertile source of mistakes and misconceptions respecting the various phases of the operations during the recent fighting on the Wilely than an ignorance of the instructions issued to the generals commanding as explanatory of the scheme of the campaign. These instructions were issued to Generals Sir Robert Walpole and to Sir John Michel a month before the commencement of the fighting, and the character of strict secrecy which was attached to them adhered until its conclusion. The necessity for secrecy, however, no longer exists, and as the document in question may be regarded as the key to the whole series of operations, its publication *in extenso* cannot but possess interest. It must be noted that its conditions were departed from so far as regards the action of Monday, the 9th instant:—

"It will be as well, before attempting to draw out any sketch of the operations of the two corps during the ensuing manœuvres, to point out clearly the conditions required to be satisfied.

The two corps are to be assembled, one at Pewsey and the other at Blanford, on August 31st, and the forward movement is to commence on Tuesday, September 3rd.

"Without making any definite dispositions of the two forces previous to their coming into actual collision, it may safely be inferred, from considerations of water supply and other causes, that they will find themselves within striking distance of one another on the 5th September.

"In naming this date no reference is made to the movements of the cavalry and horse artillery. Salisbury Plain offers peculiar advantages for the manœuvring of these arms, and no doubt the generals in command of the corps will make the fullest use of their services during the advance.

"On Thursday, September 12, it is intended the march past should take place at Beacon Hill; the previous day, September 11, is a *dies non*, local circumstances preventing the troops moving on that day from their encampments.

"The interval between the 5th and 12th is occupied as follows:—

Friday, Sept. 6th—Working day.

Saturday, Sept. 7th—Working day.

Sunday, Sept. 8th—Rest day.

Monday Sept. 9th—Working day.

Tuesday, Sept. 10th—Working day.

Wednesday, Sept. 11th—Rest day.

"There are, therefore, only four days upon which to carry on the manœuvres.

"It remains now to draw a sketch of operations which may fulfill the above conditions; and in attempting this, one difficulty arises. The distance from Beacon-hill to Codford is, as the crow flies, only about 15 miles—one day's march in fact. To extend operations over four days, when so large a force is engaged, and the distance to be traversed is so very limited, requires much care and attention. It is the object of this memorandum to form a practical basis on which to construct a general idea of the operations to be carried out day by day.

"It must also be borne constantly in mind that the general officers in command are strictly confined, in forming their plans of operations, to the area marked out in the schedule of the Act of Parliament.

"The operations at the manœuvres are represented by the action of two corps forming the advanced portions of two opposing armies.

"It is proposed, in the subjoined sketch, to make use of imaginary troops, for by this means the general in supreme command is enabled to restore equality at any moment, without violating any tactical or strategical principles, and to change the theatre of operations without interfering directly with either of the contending forces.

"On this supposition the Blanford (or Southern) Corps as part of a force which is marching from Weymouth on London. Dorchester is occupied, and a strong detachment has been sent forward towards Yeovil, to cut the Wilts, Somerset, and Weymouth line of rail. Another strong detachment may be supposed to have reached Sturminster Newton, on September 5th, in order to watch the Somerset and Dorset Railway, and to prevent any attack on the communications of the Southern Army from the direction of Wells or Bath. The right flank of the Southern Corps is protected by a force of 10,000 men, which has been landed at Poole for the purpose of co-operating with the Dorchester Corps, and has reached Ringwood on the 5th of September.

"Moreover, the whole invading force on this side of England (which may be taken at less than 50,000 men) is supposed to be subsidiary to a main invasion on the eastern or south-eastern coast, which is in process of being checked; this gives the key to the close of the minor operations, and accounts for the limited means of defence provided in this scheme.

"On the North side a corps of 15,000 men has been collected at Pewsey, the advanced portion of a force assembled at Aldershot, to stop the progress of the invader, has been pushed forward to the Wilely River; it arrives at Codford and Fisherton on the 5th of September. In addition to this force, troops are being got together at Bristol and Bath, and in preparing to join the Pewsey Corps on the Wilely, or to support it if forced to retreat from its defensive position on the line of that river.

"Part of these reinforcements, it is expected, will arrive in the neighbourhood of Warminster, on Friday, the 6th. The strong position to the south of Salisbury, as well as the city itself, is held by the defending army, the force here amounting to about 6,000 men of all arms. Wilton is occupied

by a force of 3,000 men, thus forming the connecting link between the *corps d'armes* operating near Codford, and the force above mentioned to the south of Salisbury. The Salisbury position may be supposed too strong to allow of its being carried by the force advancing from Ringwood, and as the road to London is thus barred, a turning movement may be naturally supposed to be the best scheme of attack.

"OPERATIONS OF FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 6th.

"The advance of the corps from Blanford being stopped by the presence of the Pewsey Corps holding the Wilely, preparations are made for forcing a passage of the river. The course of the action must naturally determine the orders to be issued by the general in supreme command.

"Should the attack by the Southern Army be found to be successful, intelligence might be sent to its head-quarters that a force (the number of which might be added, according to circumstances) had arrived at Warminster, about six miles from Codford St. Mary, and that the advanced guard of this force was already in sight.

To repel this attack, it would be necessary to send forward an opposing or retreating force; this weakening of the line will afford the Northern Army an opportunity of again advancing, and of driving the enemy back across the Wilely to its former position.

If the cause of the nation was unfavourable to the South, the same operation could take place without any addition being made to the Northern Force.

As the troops of both armies must necessarily water from the same stream, it might be advisable for the general in supreme command to forbid all disturbance of outposts or water parties; a certain hour being fixed for the resumption of hostilities next morning.

"Turning to the force which was at Sturminster on the 5th, we may suppose that on the 6th it was pushed forward to Maiden Bradley, arriving there on the night of the 6th, but too late to take part in the movements on the Wilely. A small force, has been pushed on to Cranborne, for the purpose of threatening Wilton. The force at Ringwood has moved forward to Downton, with a view to threatening the force which has been sent on to occupy the position to the south of Salisbury, and if possible, cutting the South-Western Railway between that city and London.

"OPERATIONS OF SATURDAY, 7th.

"The Southern Corps being reinforced by the detachment from Maiden Bradley, commences the attack with a view to effecting the passage of the River Wilely. In spite of the reinforcements which the Northern Corps has received, this second attack may be supposed to have succeeded (or, if not so, can be made successful at the option of the general in supreme command), and the Northern Corps is consequently compelled to give ground. The two sides, however, are so evenly balanced, that the South can effect nothing beyond the occupation of the position held on the 6th by the adversaries.

"The Northern Army retires towards Berwick St. James, but may hold Warminster Castle with a strong detachment.

"During this day the line to Warminster has been cut, while detachments of the invading troops have been sent up to Shaftesbury Hindon, and T. Hunt to cover the communications.

"On the right of the invader's position the force at Downton occupies that position and receives reinforcements. The Cranborne detachment moves forward to the immediate neighbourhood of Wilton, and