

any class or school of philosophic thinkers, who do not face toward the scientific east are steering up-current and will be lamentably absent, when science and philosophy enter a common barge and circumnavigate the knowable universe. For it is a part of the same conviction as to scientific method, that neither science nor philosophy will ever succeed in circumnavigating it alone. However painfully this advance may have been won and however loudly the dogmatists may deny its justification, it is sufficient here to signalize the fact that philosophy has in the present half-century thrown open her doors to the entrance of critical and empirical methods, and that the results already accruing are evidence of the bigness of her future harvest.

In general philosophy what has been called scientific method is better known, in a two-fold way, as empirical and critical. Retrospectively what we now have to rejoice in in philosophy is due about equally to two traditions, represented by Hume and Kant. The burden of current idealism, as far as it is worthy of consideration in our time, is to purify and conserve the work of Kant. And the burden of empiricism, under the same restriction, is to refute Kant with the only weapons which he himself considered of worthy temper. The battle is drawn at these close quarters and round them both is thrown a common ring of scientific procedure.

In psychology the modern transformation comes most strongly out. Here we find an actual department of knowledge, handed over to a new class of men for treatment, so remarkable is the demand for scientific method. It is no longer sufficient that a psychologist should be familiar with general philosophy and its history, or capable of acute logical criticism of systems; it is necessary if he would deal successfully with the new problems and gain the ear of the advanced philosophical public, that he should reason from a basis of fact and by an inductive procedure. In short, he must not bring his philosophy, as speculation, into psychology, but must carry his psychology as fact in its connection with physiology, ethnology, etc., into general philosophy.