

*Supply—National Defence*

With reference to the CF-5 discussion that is under way in the house and the country at the present time, the surest indication that this plane has deficiencies, which have been pointed out in press comments, is the fact that there is to be no simulator provided for training. The minister likes to use the phrase that weapons systems have become sophisticated and complex. One of the reasons for phasing out air force auxiliary training, for example, was that the planes, weapons systems and techniques had become so sophisticated and complex that it was no longer possible for we reserve types to maintain a level of operational efficiency.

Whatever might be the qualities of the CF-5 aircraft—and the minister, again, has gone into rhapsodies concerning the qualities of this airplane and has been so extravagant in his claim for its merits that I am persuaded to be somewhat suspicious—I have no doubt that some problems do exist in this regard. From my experience any new aircraft, even the old, unsophisticated aircraft of world war II, the introduction of any new aircraft—even a modification or a new mark of an existing aircraft—has always produced a whole new generation of gremlins.

I do not know whether the minister has heard of gremlins, but it would seem to me that the CF-5—and we will no doubt get some further information in the committee on this matter—must be an aircraft that is particularly infested with this mysterious creature.

Coming to the question of the simulator, Mr. Chairman, it is well established in flying training procedures, particularly with the complexities of modern aircraft, that you cannot carry on an adequate training program without some sort of ground simulated training. The very fact that Canada has decided to withdraw from the contract for this simulator would suggest that the Americans have decided that this aircraft is not suitable for operational purposes.

Just a short time ago the Associate Minister of National Defence suggested that many CF-5's had been sold to other countries. If there is such a demand for this aircraft it might still be possible, to proceed with a simulator. You will not achieve an adequate training program if you depend entirely on airborne training procedures. Not only is it expensive but it is highly inefficient, because only on the ground, in a ground trainer or a simulator can you get the controlled situation that is necessary to train aircrew in the first

instance and is then necessary to maintain operational efficiency.

Even in world war II, with relatively slow aircraft and relatively unsophisticated techniques, aircrew were not allowed to fly operationally until they had a minimum of one hour in the Link trainer before going on ops. I am referring to night fighter pilots, who had a particularly difficult problem to cope with in terms of instrument flying. But again, we have made such tremendous advances since world war II that I would suggest to the minister that if he persists in going through with the purchase of the CF-5 he should re-examine this question of the availability of a simulator.

To sum up—and I think my time has expired, Mr. Chairman—I should just like to repeat what I said in the opening part of my remarks. I would suggest to the minister that if he wants to overcome the obvious difficulties that prevail in the Department of National Defence at the present time he should give the command structures a chance to gel and work out the kinks before going any further.

● (5:30 p.m.)

Let us lay down some five year plans; let us lay down guide lines. It is not good enough to reorganize armed force headquarters and then give the command to integrate. It is all fine and good to go through the motions of integrating, but you have to provide guide lines, otherwise you get a glorified situation of confusion. You are dealing with human beings who can only adjust at a certain rate of speed. We all know that perhaps the armed forces are a little more rigid in this respect than any other type of human being. You have to take into consideration the psychological factors in the field of human adjustment. I know, as a member of the opposition, that this is a difficulty that has bothered them, that is gnawing away at the members of the armed forces. This is what is destroying the morale of the armed forces at the present time.

The minister made reference yesterday to economy in the armed forces. Perhaps he might find greater success in achieving real economies if consideration were given to managerial systems in connection with budgeting, tendering and the other aspects of defence planning, which obviously have not been under control in years gone by. I need refer only to the Avro fiasco to point out the situation which has prevailed and which no doubt has prevailed up to the present time to