

*The Address—Mr. A. Stewart*

aggressor, and why not? Have they not consistently called us aggressors? Is it wise to respond with a *tu quoque* in differences such as we have? I do not think it is.

I believe we were wrong in pursuing a policy which would have as its effect the forcing of China and Russia closer together. In so doing we are really pursuing Russian desires. We would be terribly wrong if we played still further into Russian hands and, following the logic of events, became embroiled in a war in Asia. We are wrong I think at this moment in following any policy which will add fuel to the flames of suspicion, and fear of the motives of the west which occupy so many Asian minds. Unhappily almost every day the fuel is being provided, and one of the most regrettable examples was that quoted by the member for Rosetown-Biggarr (Mr. Coldwell), when he reminded the house that India had asked the United States for two million tons of wheat. One or two Americans in responsible public positions have been so ill advised as to say that unless India followed the policies laid down by the United States she should not get the wheat. I am certain that word has flown around Asia, that the Americans are prepared to use human starvation as a political weapon. I do not believe that is the sentiment of the United States, but unfortunately rash and loose tongues give that impression. It does nothing to bring the people of Asia nearer to us.

One other thing we have to realize is that, even were the relationship between the United States and the Soviet union the most friendly, the most amicable, we should still have revolution in Asia. The people there are determined to overthrow the domination of those under whom they have suffered so long. Today we see rising in Asia the same thing which we in the west are leaving, but it is new in Asia, and there it is the resurgence of a powerful nationalism. It is a force which we cannot ignore.

The minister laid down three general considerations in the opening part of his speech. They were the necessity for the maintenance of freedom, with which we all agree; the necessity for our continued support of the United Nations, to which we subscribe; and third, he asked for a cool and rational appraisal of the present crisis, as he is entitled to ask and as we should be prepared to grant. So, I am going to try to look as objectively as is possible at the situation, first of all from the point of view of China.

If I were to be asked that very stupid question, is China an aggressor, answer yes or no, I would find tremendous difficulty in answering. I believe that China was wrong

in crossing into Korea. I believe, however, there are extenuating circumstances of which the minister himself was well aware in his speech, from which I shall yet quote several extracts, before the first committee of the United Nations on January 26. At page 11 he said:

It may still be that the Chinese consider that they are engaged not in aggression, but in self-defence; and that they are so imprisoned by their own dogma and their isolation, so influenced by bad advice and misled by wrong information, that they do not understand the intentions of the United Nations in general and of the United States in particular.

I think that is generous. I think it may be correct. The Chinese are perhaps ignorant of the good intentions of the western world. We have to realize that they have always regarded Korea as a particularly Chinese sphere of influence. Their memories are not so short that they have forgotten that, on more than one occasion, Korea has been used as the gateway for aggression on China proper. China regards us with suspicion. They may have reason. They have seen the western world, and to them the western world appears to be the United States, tied in with the enemy of the present regime, Chiang Kai-shek. They see the United States going beyond its powers and declaring that it is going to defend Formosa, although by the Cairo agreement it was specifically mentioned that Formosa should revert to China.

And if we are entitled to assume there is a certain amount of ignorance on the part of the Chinese as to our intentions, is it not possible that the actions of General MacArthur may have raised in them a feeling of real fear? General MacArthur started his last big offensive when the Chinese delegate was leaving for the United Nations, and the timing of that offensive was most unhappy. I think that we in this country, and possibly the people in other countries, have become somewhat used by now to the braggart and bumptious communiqués which were coming out of Tokyo. We knew that what was really in our minds was being spoken in London, Washington and Ottawa where responsible ministers were trying to assure the Chinese that we did not have any intention of going into Manchuria or affecting Chinese rights so far as power sites on the Yalu river were concerned.

Nevertheless, here were the communiqués of MacArthur, and he added to them only last Sunday when he said he was going to free Asia from communist domination. Those statements were not guaranteed to make the Chinese feel we were as frank and sincere as we professed to be. At the same time there was another difficulty experienced by certain nations, ours amongst them. There