transfers. In this way, an important step forward would be taken to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by additional countries. We in Canada support the inclusion in any treaty of a provision designed to achieve this objective.

I have suggested that the production of nuclear weapons by non-aligned countries would serve neither their individual national interest nor their collective responsibility to the international community. I think that is true, but I also suggest that it is unreasonable to expect such non-aligned countries to renounce in perpetuity modern methods of defence if the nuclear powers themselves are not prepared to accept some restraints and parallel obligations -- such as the extension of the nuclear-test ban to underground testing. Such a comprehensive test ban would help to prevent the indigenous development and hence the further spread of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it would meet some of the objections of the non-aligned to what they suggest are the one-sided commitments they are being asked to make. Moreover, the political and psychological benefits likely to flow from such an agreement would help create the atmosphere in which it would be possible to make progress on further steps towards arms control.

In order to ensure that it would not be clandestinely violated, however, a comprehensive test-ban treaty must make provision for adequate verification machinery. We must never lose sight of the importance of verification in agreements which effect the essentials of international security and stability.

There is one further question - that of nuclear-free zones. Negotiations are going on for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. Heads of African states have decided that Africa should be free of nuclear weapons. Again, one of the major stumbling-blocks, however, is a narrow conception of national interest. In this connection, it is well to remember that, in 1959, countries with interests in the continent of Antarctica - both nuclear and non-nuclear states - were able to reconcile their differing viewpoints and to conclude a treaty which among other things established the continent of Antarctica as a nuclear-free zone and laid down procedures whereby treaty obligations could be effectively verified in this connection. This required some surrender of immediate national interest in favour of a broader I should collective responsibility to the international community. hope that in such areas as Latin America and Africa, and perhaps eventually the Middle East, the Far East, Europe, the Arctic and other regions where political factors are admittedly far more complex than those obtaining in Antarctica, we shall also see immedlate national interest subordinated to the wider but also national interest of stability and peace. All nations should encourage the yountries that are now actively engaged in working out arrangements for nuclear-free zones. Should one be successfully established in a populated area, we shall have an important precedent and a model for further arrangements of this kind which would contribute to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

I have already mentioned the emergence of China as a nuclear power and as a new factor in the nuclear equation. The Chinese ^{leaders} on the mainland appear bent on achieving an effective ^{military} nuclear capability, however long it takes and however much