

"dumb mines". Canada has taken a particular interest in the first two issues.

(a) Scope & Verification

The heart of the reforms that are sought by the West is expansion of the scope of Protocol II to apply it to internal conflicts as well as intra-state ones. For some of our Western Group partners (most notably Denmark) this has evolved to become the key issue to which all else could be sacrificed if necessary. Canada agrees that scope is a key primary goal, but we have also held out for the inclusion of at least some language on verification to ensure that it is on the agenda of future Review Conferences.

Our analysis of the issue has always held that the scope and verification issues are linked. We believed that the NAM countries would be hostile to both of these goals and that, if the two issues remained separate they could both be lost. We therefore argued initially that we should link the issues in the hope of gaining at least one of them in full force (with the most likely outcome being weakened verification proposals in return for a full-fledged expansion of the scope of the treaty). We made our proposal to our Western Group partners in a *bout de papier* in October, 1994. This idea was accepted by all of our partners as the basis for Western Group strategy.

In the first three Experts Group meetings, the two issues were considered separately. No significant progress was made on either. During the fourth Experts Group meeting, the Danish delegation attempted to resolve the issue of scope in consultation with Cuba and Australia. In discussing their efforts with us and others in the Western Group, the Danes made it clear that they were willing to sacrifice everything (including, and especially, verification) in order to gain full-fledged expansion of the scope of the treaty. Our most recent consultations reveal a strong sense amongst people such as the Chairman of the Review Conference (Molander) that expansion of the scope is possible, but that the NAM, having no interest in a verification mechanism, is willing to play brinkmanship on verification.

Two major drafts are in play. These include a hard-line Western draft which calls for an intrusive verification regime and is known to be unacceptable to the NAM. Also extant is a Chairman's compromise paper, prepared largely by Canada, which softens the language on intrusiveness, particularly as it relates to internal conflicts. Even this second draft seems to be unacceptable to the NAM, however. Thus, the question now under consideration is whether or not to open with a strong Western position (the Western draft), in the knowledge that a compromise will soon be necessary, or to begin with the Compromise text, which itself needs to be further modified. Ambassador Molander is of the view that the NAM is ultimately unlikely to accept any compromise over this issue. For more on this question, see the attached brief on verification.

(b) Transfers