the FDA rules), it is remarkable how little federal action, either legislative or executive, has resulted from the cumulative impact of over thirty years of scientific research and political advocacy for greater tobacco regulation. The tobacco industry is rich, politically astute, and hires some of the best lawyers and lobbyists available, on the state as well as the federal level. With so much at stake financially for them, it is no wonder that they have been willing to deploy their resources in defense of their position, only moving to compromise when more serious damage might result from holding on to nonnegotiable positions. Under new financial reporting rules for Washington lobbying organizations, the heaviest-spending interest group for the first eight months of 1996 was revealed to be the largest tobacco manufacturer, Philip Morris, at $11 Million U.S.; altogether, tobacco lobbyists spent $16 million. Tobacco control also became a 1996 Presidential election campaign issue through the maladroit public pronouncements of Bob Dole about nicotine addiction and President Clinton's espousal of FDA regulations on tobacco (Kaplan, 1996). In moving against smoking, albeit with an emphasis on the threat to teenagers rather than on a society-wide basis, President Clinton became the first U.S. President of either party to take a firm anti-tobacco stance. Over the years, however, especially as Republicans have