

convention. However, it could arise through another route: safeguards over transfers from parties to non-parties. Such transfers under the NPT may carry either full-scope or item-specific safeguards requirements, but this is a matter of national policy of the supplying state. Avoiding two separate systems under a chemical weapons convention would seem desirable, but would require that a safeguards system equivalent to that applied to parties also be applied to non-parties. Otherwise, one can foresee two safeguards systems developing: an item-specific system for non-parties and a full-scope system for parties.

Another gap in the IAEA's coverage at this general level relates to motivations for the acquisition of nuclear weapons or of nuclear weapons capabilities. While the Agency's safeguards reduce certain pressures for such acquisition which can arise from fear or suspicion of the nuclear activities of other states, it leaves some other basic motivations untouched. Regional or global ambitions, objections to the perceived "protected" status of current nuclear weapons states, conventional security fears, etc., are not addressed by the Agency's verification activities. Since these concerns touch on fundamental issues of power and security, it is not surprising that the Agency is not directly involved in them. The Agency addresses the defensive fears of non-proliferating states or of some reluctant proliferators rather than the motives of states seeing some positive advantages in proliferation. It does not address the question of which proliferators might be most dangerous.

This gap affects the Agency's systems in a significant way. Because of it, as well as the Agency's use of a non-discriminatory system to the extent possible, the allocation of safeguards efforts is made according to "objective" technical/industrial criteria. The Agency's efforts are directed to states with significant civilian nuclear activities, not to states that may have the strongest motivations to acquire nuclear weapons or that might present the most undesirable consequences. There is thus a discrepancy between the distribution of the political risk of proliferation and the allocation of safeguards resources by the Agency. In particular, safeguards may be applied to states which, for all their nuclear technology, have little interest in "going nuclear," while more dangerous but less capable states get off lightly. This discrepancy seems inevitable, since a distribution of Agency efforts overtly based on assessments of motivation and consequences would probably be politically unworkable. Other verification agencies would seem to face the same problem unless they were organized on the basis of rivalries between states or alliances. An acceptance of a provision in a chemical weapons convention for compulsory challenge on-site inspections would go a long way to addressing this discrepancy between political risk and allocation of verification resources.