

ment through which we can co-operate to remove these dangers and to establish an orderly and peaceful world community. It is clear to all that this instrument is not now adequately performing that function, and that the failure arises principally from the inability of the Security Council to take effective action on the matters which come before it. Into the reason for that failure we do not now need to go. A clue to it was, however, given by certain words heard yesterday from a representative of a permanent member of the Council, "On this matter", he said, "we do not compromise."

It has been said here that the system of collective security provided within the framework of the Security Council is based upon the assumption of the unanimity of the Great Powers, and that nothing should be done here to undermine this principle which is fundamental to the Charter. Our delegation, of course, supports the principle of unanimity as we understood its intention to be when the Charter was drafted. We are all vitally concerned that unanimity should prevail amongst the Great Powers, especially on measures necessary for the maintenance of peace. The fact is, however, that such unanimity does not exist. Indeed its most characteristic feature is its absence. We are in a situation where the unanimity rule has become, in effect, both a rule of dissent, and a guarantee of inaction. We must therefore ask ourselves whether those countries which have waited with patience but with growing uneasiness for effective action on behalf of the United Nations by the Security Council, should continue to stand idly by and see their hopes for peace and security dissolved by the acids of controversy which have been distilled during the discussion in the Security Council of international problems. It seems to us that we must act, or surrender ourselves to perils of negation and frustration which we ourselves cannot influence. There are two things we may do. First, we may continue our efforts to remedy the situation which has arisen in the Security Council in such a way that it will fulfil the functions for which it was designed. We face here, however, the formidable obstacle of the veto which cannot be changed except by amendment to the Charter or by self-denying ordinances by the permanent members. Secondly, we may seek means to expand and strengthen the functions of the Assembly, so that it may stand as a second line of defence when the Security Council has failed.

I have mentioned first this major cause for concern because, like the delegate from Australia, I think we should be quite honest with ourselves in admitting that it is primarily the paralysis which has fallen upon the Security Council that leads us to contemplate the establishment of an Interim Committee of the Assembly. There are, however, other reasons for expanding the functions of the Assembly. In the short space of two years we have brought our organization into full operation and we are now finding that it has even more responsibilities than we had anticipated. Even if the political and security questions which might be discussed in an Interim Committee, are, as we hope, settled elsewhere, there are other urgent matters with which a committee of this nature might usefully occupy itself. Our agendas are crowded and there is evidence that they will be even more crowded in the future. The experience of our own committee is not such as to warrant any exaggerated optimism that the regular session of the Assembly will deal with these additional items with energy and despatch. Furthermore, our agendas will include complicated items which