necessarily identical with them, have already taken so strong a hold upon the minds of many of the younger thinkers of the United States and Canada. The subject of the Tues lay evening discussion was the interesting but exceedingly broad one of "Natural and Artificial Monopolies." Professor Andrews, of Providence, R.I., who was expected to introduce it with a written essay, and who, it was understood, would have expressed radical views, failed to arrive. It therefore devolved upon Hon. David Mills, who was to have followed with an address, to introduce the discussion. He was followed by several able speakers, Canadian and American. The noteworthy feature of the occasion was, as we are informed by attentive observers, that, while the speeches of Mr. Mills and one or two others were somewhat conservative, holding to the generally accepted views of political economists in regard to the laws of supply and demand, business competition, individualistic freedom, etc., their soberer opinions were met and almost overwhelmed by the torrents of radical eloquence which flowed from the lips of the younger and more enthusiastic debaters. And, in the opinion of those to whom we are indebted for our information, the tide of of feeling in the audience seemed to set unmistakably with the innovators and would-be iconoclasts. We refer to the incident as suggestive of the fact that, whether for good or for ill, a wonderful upheaval is just now taking place in the region of economical and sociological thought. As it was a decade or two since in regard to theology, so it is now in regard to social and political philosophy. No creed is too firmly established, no opinion too venerable or sacred, to be ruthlessly assailed, re-examined and, by many, cast aside as unsound or effete. Whereunto this thing may grow it is impossible to say. But it is useless to ignore and folly to despise the tendency. It is doubtful if the world ever before saw so much fearless investigation, or so much hard, earnest thinking. Much of the latter is, no doubt, crude enough, but much of it is also tolerably profound. Whether it shall prove to be but a passing excitement, a fashion of the day, or the precursor of an overturning and reconstruction of the whole social fabric, on a better basis or a worse, it will be for the historian of the future to record.

T is not wonderful that the sad case of the man Harvey, who has been convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of his wife and daughters, is being publicly and seriously discussed. The view seems to be very general that the poor man cannot be held morally responsible for the crime, and that he is, therefore, not a fit subject for the extreme penalty. It is not easy to see how any one can recall the circumstances of the case without sharing that opinion. The testimony shows clearly enough that Harvey loved his family. There was no "malice prepense" in the motives that led him to perpetrate the horrible deed. There is, indeed, no evidence even of a quarrel or of unpremeditated malice. Affection rather than anger or hatred seems to have nerved the murderer's arm. Nor has he, so far as appears, at any time since undergone the deluge of horror and remorse which would almost surely have, at least at times, overwhelmed any sane man, not utterly destitute of natural affection, at the recollection of his deed. The only reasonable explanation seems to be that Harvey took the lives of his victims, and intended to take that of his son, with the deliberate purpose of doing that which was best for them-saving them from the evil to come. When it is remembered that that evil was simply the disgrace likely to come upon them in consequence of the conviction of their husband and father of the crime of embezzlementa crime mean and dark enough it is true, but yet one which rests so lightly in these anhappy days, upon the minds and hearts of many—it seems impossible to resist the conclusion that the man is suffering from some form of nania, which has so changed his moral nature that what is to ordinary human beings one of the most atrocious crimes of which it is possible to conceive appears to him a venial if not a meritorious act. The case is evidently one in which the ordinary legal test of sanity in its relation to punishment, viz., the ability to destinguish between right and wrong is utterly insufficient. That test assumes that to be free from legal guilt the man must have been for the time being without moral consciousness. This instance is probably rather one in which the moral standards are so perverted that what other men deem wrong this man deems right. If such a case is conceivable it surely amounts to moral insanity of a kind which demands some other treatment or penalty than the gallows. Does not the very fact that the public mind is full of questionings and misgivings, insomuch that the infliction of the death penalty will cause it to suffer a shock, indicate that the case

is one for the substitution of imprisonment for life, for the sake, not of the man, who probably would prefer death, but for that of the general moral effect? There is not a little reason to fear that that effect, in the event of his execution, would be harmful. The example would most surely be of no avail as a deterrent for another man in a similar state of mind.

JESUIT CASUISTRY.

WHATEVER may be the issue of the present anti-Jesuit crusade, there can be no doubt that the moral theology of the Order, and especially the department known as Casuistry, is regarded with the gravest suspicion by all Protestants and by some Roman Catholics. It is equally certain that the Jesuits complain loudly of the misrepresentation of their doctrine by all their opponents from the days of Pascal to this present time. Nor can it be denied that their writings have sometimes been quoted unfairly, sentences and phrases being separated from the context, in such a manner as to misrepresent the meaning of the writers. It is, therefore, of no small importance that those who take part in the Jesuit controversy should have an accurate knowledge of the teaching of the Order, if for no other reason for this, that any unfairness is sure to recoil upon its author.

For this and other reasons we would draw attention to the publication of a work which may be regarded of paramount authority on the subject of Jesuit teaching, the commentary of Ballerini upon Busembaum's "Medulla," which is now being published with the authority of the Society.* Ballerini died before he completed the work, but it is coming out under the care of F. Palmieri, a member of the same society. One volume is just issued, and two others will follow in due time.

It is probably known to our readers that the great leaders in the teaching of Moral Theology are the Jesuit fathers, and Liguori, who is often spoken of as a Jesuit, but who was in fact a Redemptorist. He was actually the founder of the Order of the Redeemer, but his teaching differed very little from that of the Jesuits in those points on which it was assailed by Pascal in his "Provincial Letters."

When Liguori was canonized by Rome, and elevated to the position of a Doctor of the Church, the Jesuits regarded this as a justification of their moral system. And now they maintain that theirs is the more sound, even where Liguori departs from them: for example, in the matter of Probabilism, the Jesuits held that it was lawful to hold and act upon an opinion which was less probably true than another. A probable opinion was one which had the sanction of some Doctor or Father of the Church; and in cases of doubt, the Probabilists taught that it was lawful to act upon such an opinion even if the general testimony of the fathers or one's own judgment should be opposed to it. Of course such a decision could be arrived at only in cases of doubt; but it can easily be seen that such a theory gives a loophole through which a shifty conscience may on occasions escape from duty.

Against the Jesuits on this point were ranged not merely the Probabiliorists, who maintained that the more probable opinion should be followed, but also Liguori himself who advocated a modified probabilism known by the name of Equiprobabilism, according to which it was right to follow either of two opinions which seemed to have equal authority. Liguori, who has become almost the authoritative casuist of the Roman Church, published his work in the form of a commentary of the "Medulla" of Busembaum. And Gury, a member of the Society of Jesus, has put forth a compendium, which along with the work of Scavini, founded also upon Liguori, is now the manual commonly used in the Seminaries for the education of priests. This work of Gury was published again, after his death by Ballerini, a member of the same Order, with the addition of short notes. It is to the work of the same Ballerini upon the chief work of the master of them all, Busembaum, that we are now directing attention.

Ballerini departed in some respects from the teaching of Liguori and Gury, and this gave occasion to a lively controversy between him and the Redemptorists who took the part of their founder. During this controversy Ballerini published his intention of replacing his edition of Gury by a new edition of Busembaum, with some additions and alterations, and with short notes. He died in 1881, before he had completed his work. The Superiors of his Order have commissioned Father Dominico Palmieri to complete and publish the work. As we have said, one

*Ballerini, Antonii, S. J. Opus Theologicum in Busembaum Medullam. 3 Vols. Vol. 1. Prato, 1889. Price 6 francs.

volume is now out, and two more will follow, very much enlarging the work, as Ballerini had added not merely short notes, but copious commentaries upon some of the sections of the "Medulla." The general views of Busembaum, Liguori, Gury and Ballerini, are as nearly as possible identical; but any one who wishes to understand the Jesuit position, and to state with accuracy their casuistic theories will be under the necessity of consulting this new work of Ballerini which is now published with the authority of the Order.

In the controversy between Ballerini and the Redemptorists a number of special points were argued, particularly the question of Probabilism. Ballerini, as we have said, contended for this theory as the only correct one; but he went further and endeavoured to prove that not only was Liguori a Probabilist in practice, which might be conceded, but that he was so also in theory; whilst the Redemptorists contended, and rightly, that, in his later writings, he had defended Equiprobabilism instead of Probabilism proper. In the volume just published Ballerini contests this view, and offers an out-and-out defence of "Simple Probabilism, as it has been defended by the theologians of our Society." Father Palmieri is of the same opinion, declaring that the Jesuit casuistry is "a scientific system founded upon firm principles and logically coherent, from which no part can be removed or replaced by something else without destroying the whole."

We ought perhaps to mention that Pruner, in his learned work on "Moraltheologie" (published in Freiburg), maintains that "Probabilism rightly understood is essentially identical with the system of S. Alfonso di Liguori," and the general concession that Liguori was in practice, if not in theory, a Probabilist might seem to support this opinion. It may be as well, however, to give the exact teaching of the theologian to whom the origination of this system is attributed, the Spanish Dominican, Bartholomé de Medina. In his commentary on the "Summa" of S. Thomas Aquinas (published 1571) he declares that, "if an opinion is probable, it is lawful to follow it, although the opposite one be more probable." We will give it in his own words: "Si est opinio probabilis, licet eam sequi, licet opposita sit probabilior." This proposition he places as the foundation of his "Instruction to Confessors." We have no present intention of arguing the question of Probabilism. As, however, it is now reckoned a principal feature in the Moral Theology of the Jesuits and must frequently become a subject of discussion, it is necessary that those who undertake work of this kind should be sure of their ground; and they may now know with certainty that, in referring to Ballerini, they are using an authority fully sanctioned by the Order.

In saying this, we do not mean that the other authorities named are untrustworthy. Liguori, Gury, and Scavini would be quite accepted by the Jesuits as far as they go. The objection to them is that they do not go far enough. In Busembaum and now in Ballerini the complete Jesuit system of casuistry may be found. We may add that it is no tone of apology that the learned Jesuit has used in advocating the extreme teaching of his Order. He assails his opponents not merely with arguments but with copious abuse, and along with these, indirectly, Pope Innocent XI. and Benedict XIV., who protected some of these adversaries of the Order. The great offenders are of course the mendaces Janseniani et horum inepti plagiarii.

OUR LADY BEAUTY.

Our Lady Beauty, cold and dead, ye say,
Because the world is sad with sin and care,
And dull eyes open all the weary day
Yet see no water-nymph or dryad fair?
Nay surely, or the children's laughter sweet
White death would hush and slay the mother's song,
Nor would the echo of their silent feet
Be heard in empty heart-hewn chambers long.
Nay, for the beauty that the sunlight shows
Of clear warm spaces on the hills and sky,
The beauty that the breath of Cupid blows
Upon the glowing cheek and bosom high,
The matchless beauty of the souls who stand
For God and right still linger in the land.
Ottawa.

Colin A. Scott,

True or not, the following story hits off the mixture of reserve with geniality, which seems to be characteristic of Browning, and is too good to go unrecorded here. Tennyson, it appears, is extremely absent-minded, and often forgets to whom he is speaking. Once, while in full conversation with Robert Browning, he said, "I wonder how Browning's getting on?" "Why," exclaimed Robert, "I am Browning." "Nonsense," replied Tennyson, with almost an attempt at roguish raillery: "I know the fellow well; so you can't tell me you are he."—Poet-Lore.