from their beloved surroundings, would resign all charms of a pastoral life for the sake of training a new generation of preachers who would be able to handle the Word of God as a whole, as a foremost lawyer handles Blackstone, or an accomplished artisan his tools "—

which recalls to mind Prof. Murray's plea in the February number, for the best endowment of College Pulpits and the ablest preachers in them. Why cannot the two be combined? Make the Professor of the English Bible the University Preacher. His study for the class-room would help his preaching, and the students would honor in the class-room the mighty preacher. By his teaching he would come into personal contact with the students, and by his preaching he would keep in the full sweep of evangelizing work on the highest plane—at the sources of power.

Inherent Right *vs.* Common Law Right.

THE *Examiner* of Jan. 8, commenting on the plan proposed in Dr. Funk's contribution to the symposium in the December number of THE HOMILETIC REVIEW, draws a distinction between an "inherent right" and a "common law right," saying:

"Under [the common law] any person had a right to make and sell liquor, a right that was exercised under the common law in England for centuries before there was any excise legislation. No historical and legal fact is better attested than that. The citation from the Supreme Court's decision does not dispute this common law right. It denies the 'inherent' right to sell liquor. An 'inherent' right is one that is inalienable, that the law cannot touch, like the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. There is no such right to sell liquor, says the Supreme Court, and few will quarrel with its dictum."

Also, in the centuries referred to, any two knights might fight each other to the death, wherever they happened to meet. That would hardly be a "common law right" now. The question is, what would happen in the United States to-day, if all license laws were repealed. It is claimed that this would be "free rum." But, most assuredly, it would not. For, 1. There would remain the common-law right to proceed against any liquor-selling establishment as a nuisance, which Blackstone defines as "anything that worketh hurt, inconvenience or damage." It does not matter that at some former time, when the injury was not clearly understood, liquor-selling was allowed, as slaughter-houses and grave-yards were allowed in towns, and as pigs were allowed to run the streets of New York. These things would be promptly declared nuisances now. The common-law right to declare the saloon a nuisance would rest, not upon what our ancestors knew 500 years ago, but upon what we know it to be now. 2. All the right of restriction which we now exercise would remain. We could forbid a man to sell on Sunday, after midnight, to a minor, to a drunkard, etc., without giving him permission to sell at any other time. There is "no inherent right" to sell, with which the sharpest restriction would conflict. The Supreme Court says:

"The police power of the State is fully competent to regulate the business, to mitigate its evils or to suppress it entirely. THERE IS NO INHERENT RIGHT IN A CITIZEN TO SELL INTOXICATING LIQUORS BY RETAIL; IT IS NOT A PRIVILEGE OF A CITIZEN OF A STATE OR OF A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES. AS IT IS A BUSINESS ATTENDED WITH DANGER TO THE COMMUNITY, IT MAY, AS ALREADY SAID, BE ENTIRELY PROHIBITED, OR BE PERMITTED UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS AS WILL LIMIT TO THE UTMOST ITS EVILS. THE MANNER AND EXTENT OF THE REGULATION REST IN THE DISCRETION OF THE GOVERNING AUTHORITY."