

her present liabilities a small residuo would be left to extend her limits by opening new missions.

There is also one other plan deserving of consideration suggested by the Earl of Derby, which would preserve to the churches of England and Scotland all proceeds of the revenues guaranteed to them under the 7th and 8th Geo. 4, c. 62, and 8 and 4 Vic. c. 78, in absolute and permanent possession; but conferring on the Legislature the free and unlimited power of dealing with any portion of the Clergy Reserves not already so appropriated and allotted, or in other words giving the two churches in perpetuity all that is conferred upon them by the provision of the 8 and 4 Vic. c. 78, and of which they have been in actual possession 14 years.

Either of these plans would give us but a small measure of justice, yet we believe would satisfy the members of the Church of England; and that party measure of justice can not be withheld from us, those rights can not be taken from us except by ROMAN CATHOLIC VOTERS. Hence his Lordship reminds us that "every principle of duty and interest directs us to adopt such measures as shall unite more cordially the French and English population of the Province," whilst he reminds them that "if from a wicked and wanton exercise of the power recently conferred upon them by a British Parliament, trusting in their integrity and honor, they perpetrate an act so offensive, it will never be forgotten, but will be fatally remembered when we far surpass them in population, and of consequence in the numbers of representatives, and then the evil they have done to us will be returned to them ten fold, and the lesson of bitter retaliation will sweep away their magnificent Endowments."

And that their Endowments are "magnificent" will be felt when we state that from a parliamentary return now before us we find that in the ten years ending 1852 the revenues of the Roman Catholic Endowment alone—the Jesuit Estate of St Sulpice—yielded a revenue of £128,000, being one-third more than the Clergy Reserves have yielded in forty years. Here then is something worth fighting for.—*British Guardian*.

News Department.

From Papers by R. M. S. Canada, Nov. 11.

SEBASTOPOL.—The intelligence received from the Crimea in the course of the week has been unusually interesting, though it was not until yesterday that we obtained any authentic report from our own camp.—Ample details, however, have now reached us, from both sides, of the effect produced by the fire of besiegers and besieged during the first three or four days after the allies began their attack. Telegraphic accounts of a less satisfactory but more exciting character, have communicated the important fact of a vigorous attempt, made by the Russian forces without the walls, on October 25th and 26th, to cut the allied army off from the main basis of its operations, and compel it to raise the siege. A dropping fire of bullets, chiefly Russian, of a latter date, keeps us acquainted with the general progress of events from the 26th to the 29th ult. Our readers will find the various items of intelligence, of which we speak, in our Supplement. A few words on the three periods of the siege may help to a better understanding of the existing state of affairs.

The attack began by a cannonade both from sea and land upon the outer defences of the place. The English on the east, the French on the south, and the combined fleets upon the west, kept up during the greater part of the 17th a perfect storm of shot and shells upon the forts, bastions, and outworks, with which the city of Sebastopol is defended towards Balacava and towards the sea. The trial of strength between the seaward fortifications and the ships was one of great interest. The forts engaged, amounting some 250 guns, were completely silenced by the fire of the two squadrons, which suffered a loss quite insignificant compared with that which usually attends a naval engagement. Not a hundred men were killed, and but two ships were so much injured as to require to go into port for repairs. Whether it will be found possible to make any further use of the fleets against the inner defences seems to be doubtful, but at any rate the experience gained will be of service, should the war continue to another year, in the Baltic. On the land side the allies were less successful. The French had constructed their works in far too slight a manner, and the damage done to them by the Russian fire was such that towards the close of the day they were not able to respond, and could not resume the bombardment till the 19th. On our side no such miscalculation was shown; and before the second day was over, it is said that

our ammunition became scant, and that we returned the fire of the Russian batteries but indifferently. On the Russian side astonishing vigour and energy were shown. The amount of their cannon turned out to be enormous, the calibre great, the supply of ammunition unbanded, the command of labour immense, and we are bound to add, the spirit displayed on the part both of the soldiery and inhabitants, excellent. The Russian works were repaired almost as fast as destroyed; their guns were remounted, or fresh ones found to supply the place of those damaged: the fire scarcely slackened at any time, and it became evident enough, after the first three days, that the siege would extend to an unexpected length.

Still from the 17th to the 24th the allies made steady (though, according to Lord Raglan, not very perceptible) progress. In sieges the common proverb is reverse, and such are the advantages of the assaulting party that "non regreditur ex progressu" is an admitted principle. The Russian Commanders saw that unless a serious diversion could be effected the fortress was doomed, and accordingly on the 25th the attack was made, which has caused so much alarm and anxiety in England, and is still represented in some quarters as threatening our ultimate success. Liprandi, a Russian General, hitherto little known to fame, at the head of the entire force collected at Batschi-Serai, since the battle of Alma, amounting probably to at least, 30,000 men, precipitated himself, on the morning of Oct. 25, upon the base of the British operations near Balacava. The attack, though it could not have been quite unexpected (for such a movement had been threatened as early as the 21st) came, if not necessarily from the nature of the ground, apparently from the excellence of the Russian arrangements, with all the force of a surprise. The Turkish corps, placed to defend the redoubts commanding the Batschi-Serai road, fled in disorder on the Russian approach, leaving the fieldworks and guns to the enemy. His further advance was stayed by the combined efforts of the allies, but he must, nevertheless, have remained during the night of the 25th in a position cutting the British line, and still master of some at least of the forts yielded by the Ottomans. What follows is not quite so clear; but we rather infer that on the 26th, by concert with the garrison of Sebastopol, a second attack was made by Liprandi from the position which he had won the day before, and at the same time a sortie en force from the town was attempted against the French lines. Both these attempts appear to have signally failed; and on the 27th Liprandi is said to have been in his turn attacked, and compelled to fall back upon Batschi-Serai, where he has, probably, once more fixed himself. The attack of Liprandi has thus proved ineffectual. It has interrupted our proceedings, delaying the fall of Sebastopol for a few days, and perhaps caused us a sensible loss; but there is not the slightest reason to think that it is likely to have any effect upon the final issue of the siege.

Since Liprandi's retreat operations have been resumed against the town. Accounts, exclusively Russian, have reached us to the 1st, in which we are told that "nothing important had occurred." It is however, admitted that the enemy had completed a second parallel, and advanced nearer so much to the walls. It is plain, therefore, that the diversion of Liprandi has failed, and that the siege is being vigorously pressed. The 1st and 2nd of November has been mentioned as the day upon which the final assault would be made. This expectation can hardly be realised, but we may expect soon to hear of the result. Let us wait for it in patient hope, and meanwhile let us shut our ears to the thousand and one lying rumours, the inventions of stockjobbers and alms-men, which float through the metropolis, agonising some and annoying all. If official intelligence is ever to anticipate private rumour, it will be when there is such an event to communicate as the long looked-for fall of Sebastopol.—*Guardian*.

OFFICIAL DESPATCHES.

No. 527. *Briannia*, off the Katscha, Oct. 18, 1854.

Sir—1. I beg you will acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the siege batteries of the allied armies opened fire upon the Russian works, south of Sebastopol, about half-past six o'clock yesterday morning, with great effect and small loss.

2. In consequence of the most urgent request of Lord Raglan and General Canrobert, it was agreed by the admirals of the allied fleets that the whole of the ships should assist the land attack by engaging the sea batteries north and south of the harbour, on a line across the port, as shown in the accompanying plan; but va-

rious circumstances rendered a change in the position of the ships necessary and unavoidable.

3. The *Agamemnon*, *Sanspareil*, *Sampson*, *Trieste*, *Terrible*, *Sphinx* and *Lyuz*, and *Albion*, *London* and *Arctica*, towed by the *Firebrand*, *Niger*, and *Truce*, engaged Fort Constantine and the batteries to the northward; while the *Queen*, *Briannia*, *Trafalgar*, *Vengeance*, *Rodney*, *Bellerophon*, with *Venerus*, *Porpoise*, *Hatfield*, *Highflyer*, *Spitfire*, *Spitfire*, and *Cyclops*, lashed on the portside of the several ships, gradually took up their positions, as nearly as possible as marked on the plan.

4. The action lasted from about half-past one to half-past six p. m., when, being dark, the ships hauled off.

5. The loss sustained by the Russians, and the damage done to Fort Constantine and batteries, cannot of course as yet be correctly ascertained.

6. An action of this duration, against such formidable and well-armed works, could not be maintained without serious injury; and I have to regret the loss of forty-four killed and two hundred and sixty-six wounded, as detailed in the accompanying list. The ships, masts, yards, and rigging, are more or less damaged, principally by shells and hot shot. The *Albion* has suffered much in her hull and masts; the *Niger* in her masts, she having tailed on the reef, from which she was got off by the exertions of Commander Kynaston of the *Spitfire*, whose crew and vessel were necessarily exposed in performing this service; but with the exception of the *Albion* and *Arctica*, which ships I send to Constantinople to be repaired, I hope to make my squadron serviceable in twenty-four hours. Foreseeing from the nature of the attack that we should be likely to lose spars, I left the spars topmasts and yards on board Her Majesty's ship *Vulcan*, at this anchorage, where I had placed her with all the sick and prisoners.

7. I have now the pleasure of recording my very great satisfaction with the ability and zeal displayed by Rear-Admirals Sir Edmund Lyons and the Hon. Montagu Stopford, and all the captains under my command, as well as my sincere thanks to them, and to the officers, seamen, and marines employed, for their unremitting exertions and the rapidity of their fire, in the absence of a large number of the crews of each ship, who were landed to assist in working the siege batteries, &c., on shore, and to this circumstance I attribute the small loss of killed and wounded.

8. The gallant and skilful conduct of our French allies in this action was witnessed by me with admiration, and I hear with regret that they have also suffered considerable loss.

9. I beg to express my gratitude at the manner in which Ahmed Pacha, the Turkish admiral, did his duty. I have, &c. (Signed)

J. W. D. DUNBAR, Vice-Admiral.
The Secretary of the Admiralty, &c.

The next despatch, from Lord Raglan, was received at the War Office on Monday night:—

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, Oct. 23.—My Lord Duke.—The operations of the siege have been carried on as remittingly since I addressed your Grace on the 18th inst. [This despatch has never been received at the War-office.]

On that afternoon, the French batteries not having been able to open, the enemy directed their guns almost exclusively on the British intrenchments, and maintained a very heavy fire upon them till the day closed, with less damage, I am happy to say, to the works, and with fewer casualties, than might have been anticipated.

On the following morning, shortly after daylight General Canrobert not only resumed his fire from the batteries which had been injured, but materially added to the weight of his attack by the fire of batteries which he had caused to be constructed the previous day, and these have continued ever since; and he has had it in his power to push his approaches forward, and, like the English, materially to injure the defences of the place; but these are as yet far from being subdued: neither is a serious diminution of the fire perceptible.

Our fire has also been constant and effective; and the enemy, having at their disposal large bodies of men and the resources of the fleet and arsenal at their command, have been enabled by unceasing exertions to repair their redoubts to a certain extent, and to replace many of the guns that have been destroyed in very short space of time; and to resume their fire from works which we had succeeded in silencing.

This facility of repairing and re-arming the defences naturally renders the progress of the assailant slow than could be wished; and I have it not in my power to inform your Grace, with anything like certainty, when it may be expected that ulterior measures may be undertaken.

I have the honour to transmit to your Grace the return of killed and wounded between the 18th and 23rd inst. inclusive. In my last I announced to your Grace the death, which had just been reported to me, of the deeply-lamented officer the Hon. Colonel Hood of the Grenadier Guards. No other military officer has fallen; but Major Prince Edward of Saxo-Weimar