

most that we may be able to do is to retain the existing language. I shall have a try at strengthening it, but we have tried this before without success. In any case, there would be difficulties about your suggestion for a phrase requiring the parties "to eliminate conflict in their economic policies" because of the issues of free enterprise vs. socialism that might be considered to be involved. The use twice in your addition of the words "in common" might also be taken to require the establishment of special agencies in the North Atlantic area, against which there is very strong opposition.

Paragraph 9. The phrase you would like included was dropped, on the ground that it carried the implication that the North Atlantic Council would undertake functions properly belonging to the Security Council. I think that this objection has some weight and there would be strong resistance to its re-insertion in the draft.

Paragraph 10. We hear that there are difficulties with the Senators over the language of Article 5, but I will await further information on the State Department's views before reporting further to you. I like your re-draft for 5 BIS, and we shall try this out.

Paragraph 14. There is resistance to your wording on the ground that it should be superfluous in such respectable company for the parties to promise to be good. We may, however, have further proposals from the State Department on this point, as they are giving consideration to expanding the Article so as to include an obligation which might permit the expulsion of an offending party.

Paragraphs 8, 13, 17, and 18. These are all good drafting points. They should not come up for discussion in the Ambassadors' Group, but we will keep them in mind when the draft is next considered for detailed revision by the working group.

284.

DEA/283(s)

*Ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'Irlande
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister for External Affairs of Ireland
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

PERSONAL

Dublin, February 7, 1949

Dear Mr. Pearson,

By the time you receive this letter you will probably have received our reply to the Aide Memoire,† delivered by the United States Government, in relation to the proposed Atlantic Pact. I am writing this personal letter to you as I want to explain our attitude a little more fully and also because I feel that you might be in a position to assist in ending a deadlock which is detrimental, not merely to us, but to Britain and, to a certain degree, to the success of the Atlantic Pact.

Our Aide Memoire of the 7th February sets out the main considerations relating to the problem of Partition and I need not, therefore, repeat these to you. It is by no means an easy problem from the point of view of Britain, because of its internal political implications in the field of English politics. However, I believe that