

surely throw serious doubt on their desire to have the conference meet at all.

We have the right to expect that the Communist Governments to whom our resolutions have been forwarded should now without delay designate their own representatives, and express their views regarding time and place.

Once the conference meets there will be ample opportunity to iron out other difficulties which may arise. But are these of sufficient consequence to justify the other side in boycotting this necessary first step in peace-making, not only in Korea, but perhaps over a broader area?

For it is surely not too much to hope that if we are successful in negotiating on a specific and defined range of questions, we may succeed also in strengthening the prospects for the settlement over wider Asian issues; not necessarily through the same mechanism which we have recommended for the Korea Conference.

But for this wider objective to be achieved or even approached, we must first succeed in making peace in Korea. If - and this is a big "if" - there is good faith and good will on both sides, a settlement here should be possible. I suggest that any such settlement must provide for a free and united Korea, with a government resting on the will of the Korean people freely expressed through elections held under United Nations supervision. All foreign forces should, of course, be withdrawn, and Korea's security might be provided for under an international and supervised guarantee.

The Korean problem is certainly not an insoluble one. If a fair and lasting solution is desired it can be found. It is certainly desired by the vast majority of the members of the United Nations I am sure. If the Communist side, or anyone else, by obstruction and inadmissible demands make a peaceful solution impossible, then the responsibility for failure will be made clear, and the United Nations, at least, will have done its duty.

Korea, in short, will provide an acid test for the hope and claim that successful negotiation can and must be conducted now, not only on the future of Korea but on European and cold war problems generally, in order to bring about an easing of fear and tension, and a peace which will be something better than cold war.

There is another respect in which Korea is an acid test; in the assistance we give the Korean people to restore and rehabilitate their country, ravaged and devastated by war.

I am certain this Assembly will agree with the Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold, that it is of high importance that this collective responsibility for reconstruction and rehabilitation in Korea "should be carried out honourably, vigorously and generously by the United Nations and with the widest possible participation of its members."

In referring to Korea as a supreme test, I am well aware that the obstacles to agreement, like the present divisions in our world, may seem great. Yet we can remind ourselves that, as it has been said, the longest journey must begin with a single step. It is the belief of the country which I represent, and I am sure of the overwhelming majority of the countries represented here, that, if this all-important first step - to co-operate in bringing peace to Korea - is taken by those who speak in the name of the world community in