

of understanding, the United Nations atomic policy must be based on something more than the unverifiable pledge of member governments that atomic energy, under national control, will not be used for war. Without international confidence, pledges against war, or methods of war, are useless and often worse than useless.

Acceptance of the validity of this principle is the reason why the majority of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the majority of the Assembly, have insisted on effective controls, on effective safeguards, as the prelude to prohibition, temporary or permanent.

The Soviet Delegation tell us that they too want effective control. But it is at facts, not at words alone, that we must look, and the facts of the Soviet position in this matter suggest to us that their acceptance of effective control is based on a distortion of the meaning of those words.

The Soviet proposals for control admit only of fixed periodic inspection, and even that inspection is merely of such facilities as the national governments concerned may choose to declare to an international authority. The Soviet proposals also include I admit special investigations, when there is evidence of illegal activity. But how is such evidence to be obtained? If we had enough confidence to convince us that it would be given automatically by every national government to an international agency, then we would have so much confidence that we would not need any international control at all.

The Soviet provisions regarding inspection seem to us, in short, to be simply not good enough to accomplish the purpose which we all have in mind.

The leader of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Vishinsky, who has a very penetrating mind, made some interesting observations the other day, in the First Committee of this Assembly on the inadequacy of periodic inspection. Discussing in the course of the debate on the Greek question, the possibility of confirming by inspection that the Albanian authorities had interned and disarmed Greek guerrillas who had fled to their territory, Mr. Vishinsky said (I quote from the verbatim record):

"You say: well, then we have no guarantees that these partisans may not rise again and suddenly crop up in our territory. If so, what guarantee do you have that you (that is, the International Commission) will not be shown several thousand interned persons, and as soon as the Commission will leave, they will be permitted to arm and will be led into your territory? What guarantee do you have against that? What does this mean, disarmed and interned? Disarmed means that they were deprived of their weapons. Right? If they are deprived of their weapons today, what safeguards do you have, to follow your own argument, that they will not be given an opportunity tomorrow, to re-arm?"

I suggest therefore to the Soviet representative on the Atomic Energy Commission and on this Committee that the same principles of inspection apply to control in the atomic field, though the consequences of the evasion of ineffective control would be immeasurably more important.

Let me give one other example of what appears to be if understand it right the Soviet Government's idea of inspection. Last month the Security Council was discussing a proposal, worked