the mobilization of the popular sectors by populist leaders led to the political inclusion of the popular sectors in ways that violated the rule of law, and this often prompted highly repressive, authoritarian responses. Although the cycles of populism and authoritarian repression have shared, populism and authoritarian leadership styles have re-emerged in new guises. As Michael Shifter notes, the winning formula for seizing power in Latin America today is "challenge the political establishment, eschew party attachments and ideological labels, espouse direct contact with 'the people', and use simple language and be authoritative (if not authoritarian)" (*Los Angeles Times*, January 16, 2000). Contemporary populists, including those who implement neoliberal policies, remain prisoners of this pattern.

DILEMMAS AND OPTIONS

The options for Latin America vary greatly, and must be qualified by the acknowledgment that, from the perspective of democratization, there are at least two Latin Americas. The first Latin America has made progress toward achieving electoral democracy and good governance, and the prospects for further democratization are encouraging. This includes countries like Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile (in spite of the fact that it has not completed the transition to democracy), the Commonwealth Caribbean, where support for democracy is comparable to European levels. Recent progress has also been observed in countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. The second Latin America includes the electoral autocracies of Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador, where the formalities of democratic rule have been preserved while its spirit has been violated. Here, public support for democracy is more incoherent, ambivalent, and volatile.

The two Latin Americas may require separate treatment. In the former countries, the challenge is to deepen democracy and improve its quality. In the latter, the challenge is to encourage democratic reforms and prevent further backsliding. For the electoral autocracies, five dilemmas stand out.

Democracy versus Sovereignty

Dilemmas humanitarians for the collective defence of democracy such as the OAS Resolution 1080 are triggered when constitutional processes are interrupted. Should this mechanism be tightened to address more subtle threats, or would that lead to unwarranted interviews into the sovereign authority of states?

> The will and tolerance for intervention in support of democracy that was notable in the early 1990's has diminished.

Outlawed: OAS Resolution 1080 represents a landmark in hemispheric diplomacy. Approved in June 1991, it has been convoked 4 times (Haiti in 1991; Peru 1992; Guatemala 1993; Paraguay 1996). The Resolution, entitled "Representative Democracy" was approved by the OAS General Assembly on June 5, 1991. It calls for "the immediate convocation of a meeting of the Permanent Council of the OAS in the case of any event giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization's member states...". The result of this process can be, ultimately, the suspension of membership in the OAS.

Resolution 1080 is generally regarded as having worked well, even if some members would have liked it to be stronger. The principle of collective defence of representative democracy in the Americas is part of the new inter-American landscape. It is hard to say, however, whether Resolution 1080 of the OAS would be approved by member states today. The will and tolerance for intervention in support of democracy that was notable in the early 1990's has diminished. The old mantra of "community and convergence" may have captured the spirit of hemispheric relations during the process of the Washington Consensus in the early 1990s, but today "cooperation and respect for differences" might be more appropriate.

The problem with Resolution 1080 is that it only deals with clear-cut violations of constitutional norms. A US initiative to tighten this loophole during the June 1999 meeting of the OAS in Guatemala was defeated, mainly because it was introduced unilaterally and without consultation. The US initiative called for "ongoing and creative work to consolidate democracy and a continuing effort to prevent and anticipate the very causes of the problems that undermine or threaten democratic rule." (Draft Resolution presented at the twenty-ninth regular session of the OAS General Assembly, Guatemala City, June 6, 1999). The US proposal would have had the OAS Secretary General convene a "Group of Friends" whenever a development in a member state appeared to threaten democracy. This group would work with the state to make recommendations and report to the Secretary General of the OAS.

The idea of concerted efforts to prevent backsliding is not a bad one in principle, but the language of the US proposal was tendentious. In another context Guillermo O'Donnell has argued that the term 'consolidation' implies a teleological bias: all countries