

only states - not members of the secretariat - could report suspected violations. This should not be allowed to happen again.

#### **4. Coordination and communication**

Multilateral sanctions programmes are extremely complex, multi-level bureaucratic operations. Obviously, their successful execution depends on coordination and communication among and between levels. The aforementioned SAM/SAMCOMM mission made great strides in this regard, partly because of its use of computers and satellite communications, partly because it utilized existing bureaucratic apparatus wherever appropriate (e.g. the EU customs office), and not least because of the presence of effective liaisons between SAMs and their host governments, the Yugoslavia sanctions committee, the UN secretariat, and the Security Council members.

However, coordination means more than just having enough of the right people talking to one another on the right equipment. It also entails a clear division of powers and responsibilities between levels. The Security Council must clearly define what level of bureaucracy is responsible for which tasks, it must route Article 50 applications to the appropriate forum, and it must be willing to serve as the court of last resort regarding humanitarian exemptions.<sup>82</sup> It must clearly define the responsibilities of relevant regional organizations, and assess realistically their competence to perform those tasks. Finally, in matters where the meaning of a resolution is in need of clarification, the Council must either accept the role of final arbiter, or clearly elucidate the procedures by which the sanctions committee is to make such judgements.

#### **5. The politics of reform**

The proposals for administrative reform explored in this section will require the initiative of several states if they are to be implemented. However, many of them could be successfully pushed through without exorbitant cost, and without concrete support from states which oppose the strengthening of the UN system. Stremlau argues that states such as Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden "enjoy several comparative advantages for exploring options and promoting actions to strengthen the UN's sanctions infrastructure." In particular, these states have demonstrated a deep and enduring commitment to the UN, they have a high degree of credibility as a result of their ongoing material and financial support for the institution, they are not seen as 'arrogant' great powers, and they have a wealth of diplomatic experience and

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<sup>82</sup> Doxey, United Nations Sanctions: Current Policy Issues. p.34.