

ant, or was politically “sensitive” (i.e., a health and safety standard).

To identify the effect of the complainant’s level of development as conditioned by the WTO, this interaction term was also included. Importantly, the interaction term is positive and statistically significant, meaning that the WTO has *increased* the gap between developed- and developing-country complainants with respect to their ability to get defendants to offer concessions. In short, rich complainants have become significantly more likely to secure their desired outcomes under the WTO; for poorer complainants the situation is less clear.

Figure 2 graphically depicts this. Holding all other variables at their sample means, the predicted probability of a poorer complainant (with a 10th percentile GDP per capita value of about \$2,150) securing full concessions from a defendant was between 0.27 and 0.49 under the GATT, and is between 0.41 and 0.64 under the WTO. These ranges are 90 percent confidence intervals, so the fact that there is still wide overlap between them (from 0.41 to 0.49) is interesting. The data, so far, hints that developing countries have improved their performance as complainants, but they by no means allow any reasonable degree of certainty about this trend. At the same time, the situation for a wealthier complainant (with the 90th percentile GDP per capita value, of \$29,250) has unambiguously improved under the WTO. The predicted probability of full concessions for a country fitting this description was between 0.33 and 0.48 under GATT—which is on par with an equally-sized, poorer complainant—but has risen to between 0.63 and 0.78 under the WTO. Interestingly, this finding does *not* hold for US-EC disputes, which in fact have been *no more likely* to end favourably under the WTO (see below). The point to keep in mind is that these results regarding developing countries are not an artefact of the exceptional prominence of the US and EC as complainants.