

There are moral, ethical, and legal imperatives for dealing with human rights in complex emergencies. Many of these imperatives come from existing legal and moral obligations incumbent upon the UN as the unique universal organization for the world community. In addition, there are a number of relatively 'new' operational imperatives which re-validate the incorporation of human rights into UN field operations.

One manifestation of this changing set of imperatives, is the reduced number of classic style peace-keeping³ operations and the growth in the number and size of complex emergencies that the UN must deal with. There is no need here to examine why these emergencies or conflicts have become more complex, or even whether they in fact have become more complex. Perhaps we have only started to understand the complexity of international conflicts that previously were 'simplified' by the pressures of real politic or cold war politics, combined with a strong reluctance to look beyond the veil of state sovereignty⁴.

Along with this changing face of UN imperatives and challenges, is an increased understanding of the linkage between human rights and the achievement of peace and security. There is a growing imperative to deal with human rights if the UN wants to be successful in the broad range of peace-keeping, conflict resolution, or prevention activities.

1.2 The Imperatives

Moral and ethical

Political leadership and political decision-making devoid of moral and ethical standards are antithetical to peace and security. And, as almost every human rights activist knows, human rights equals politics. To de-link human rights from the politics of any situation is patently impossible. Ignoring human rights in addressing the politics of any situation is of course quite common, but does not change the linkage with human rights. Failure to factor in the human rights elements of a conflict invariably creates an underlying instability for narrow political

³ *Peace-keeping* has become a variable term, reflecting the tension between its traditional definition, ie. interpositional military forces between consenting parties, and new variations such as "inducement operations" where Daniels and Hays argue for coercive operations akin to Ch.VII operations. This study uses peace-keeping in its broadest sense so as to include peace-making, peace-enforcement, peace-building, et al., and possibly involving CIVPOL and civilian personnel in addition to the military. The study also uses the more inclusive term *UN field operations* for situations where a UN operation is not predominantly a military peace-keeping operation and includes, or consist entirely of entities such as a human rights operation, a humanitarian assistance operation, a CIVPOL operation, or any variation of the above.

⁴ see Kofi Annan, *Peace Operations and the United Nations: Preparing for the Next Century*, to be published by the International Peace Academy circa May 1996, for a discourse on how classic state consent now must be increasingly replaced by 'constructive' consent often obtained through new post cold war forms of coercively induced agreement by parties to a conflict for a UN peace-keeping operation, eg. for "societies bordering on anarchy, the old dictum of 'consent of the parties' will be neither right or wrong; it will be, quite simply, irrelevant." p.6 *ibid*.