This study must be seen in the context of a series of three previous studies which have focussed over the years on the singular role of monitoring and verification in ensuring compliance with arms control commitments. The first study² reviewed the experience of verification in a conceptual context and forecast its evolution to the year 2000, emphasizing the growing importance of multilateral verification. The second study³ built upon that background and explored the positive contribution which synergies might have in the verification process relating to constraints on proliferation. The third study⁴, again within the conceptual context, identified the convergence that the processes involved in verification, confidence building and peace operations might have in achieving a common goal of "increased transparency." This fourth study builds upon the other three conceptual studies to develop a practical application of experience to a real and ongoing process.

Of particular interest is the fact that the proposals contained in this study are realistic and workable and can be implemented basically within existing resources. The study does not propose an additional layer of bureaucracy (and the concomitant delay) in the United Nations decision-making process. It does identify areas within the United Nations framework in which similar functions are now carried out and from which resources might be drawn. It does not call for sweeping institutional changes or for major human resource or financial commitments. Instead, it postulates that a modest increase of indigenous capability and operational responsibility at the senior decision-making level of the United Nations organization, along the lines of a Centre for Information, Training and Analysis, would significantly enhance the United Nations' ability to meet the challenges faced as the international community approaches the new millennium.

² Sidney Graybeal, et al., Verification to the Year 2000, Arms Control Verification Studies, no. 4 (Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1991).

³ Patricia Bliss McFate, et al., Constraining Proliferation: The contribution of Verification Synergies, Arms Control Verification Studies, no. 5 (Ottawa: External Affairs and International Trade Canada, 1993).

⁴ Patricia Bliss McFate, et al., The Converging Roles of Arms Control Verification, Confidence Building Measures and Peace Operations: Opportunities for Harmonization and Synergies, Arms Control Verification Studies, no. 6 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1994).